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sexta-feira, 12 de novembro de 2021

Glasgow – Guinness mugs on the loose

 1 - The mandarin spectacle – COP 26

 2 - Against the irrationality inherent to capitalism? Not really…

  wwwwwwwwwwIIIIII wwwwwwwww

1 - The mandarin spectacle – COP 26

It becomes absolutely evident that COP 26 is just a media number to convince the naive that the large and small national mandarins present in Glasgow will do something substantive in the environmental chapter. With less media attention, an event supported by the Alliance of World Scientists in August with more than 15,000 signatories, from 160 countries, in support of the following declaration: World Scientists Warning of a Climate Emergency.

For the solemnity intended to be given to the Glasgow conference, it began with an error revealing gross ignorance. Prosecutors presented a video about the extinction of dinosaurs and did not think that those animals died in a cold climate after a meteorite hit; and not with global warming like the one we are witnessing. The meteorite of that time today would be capitalism. And if someone insane thinks of applying a radical solution to cool the climate, it's enough to generate a… nuclear war; the bombs and vehicles to drop them are in constant need...

COP26 clearly shows its oligarchic spirit by considering, almost exclusively, the presence of representatives from countries, from governmental spheres; with the … natural removal of thousands of NGOs dedicated to gathering information and putting in the field options that governments, on top of their oligarchical pedestals, do not consider it per se and, even less, deign to apply. On November 3, thousands of NGOs present in Glasgow, the accredited were just four! The dichotomy between the set of political classes present at the conference, and the NGOs, is clear. NGOs originated social initiatives, in spite many of them they naively believe that those political classes, under the effect of a divine breath, will be in charge of burying capitalism and redeem themselves, like ascetics, in a frugal convent life…

 


For national oligarchs, the world belongs to them, even if some are more equal than others…; and the common people, they cannot mix with the oligarchs, they stay at the door. The young Greta Thunberg[1] portrayed this situation very well – “This is no longer a climate conference, it is a festival washing the green image for the global North”; thus, this situation deserves all critical radicalism, showing itself as a mirror of what capitalism is and, in this context, it deserves all the opposition that is necessary to make to the political classes that, as a rule, are problems in themselves and only for the naive, resolution builders.

The global political class, faced with opposition as weak as that emanating from ecological parties and groups, does not even hide; on the contrary, it has no concern to hide its image as reckless spendthrifts, nor the exhibitionism and arrogance typical of those who know how poor the understanding and performance of victims of the dominant economic and political system is. As it is mirrored in Glasgow… Let's look at some examples.

A few days ago, from October 29th to 31st, in Rome, at the meeting of the G20, a group formed by the countries with the greatest economic power in the world, they received from the partner Maserati 40 cars available to the mandarins (read heads of State and of Government) for use during the conclave. 

To participate in COP26, 400 private jets arrived in Glasgow, each with a mandarin (the ride is not planned!) all “full of enthusiasm” to participate in the circus. It is known that they emit 13,000 t of CO2, equivalent to the consumption of 1600 Scots during a year, according to the Sunday Mail!

Still in Glasgow, Biden's enthusiasm was so great that he was dozing a little during a session… Days before, Biden (some people call him Zombiden) disembarked in Rome for a G20 session, in his Cadillac One, a mastodon with an 8100 cc engine, very ecological because… it consumes only 29 to 64 litres of gasoline per 100 kilometres (!) and that circulated in a procession with more… 84 cars for the safety of the individual. But it would be unfair if we limited ourselves to the behavior of the limited Biden as Ursula von der Leyen, more measured, only used her private jet on 18 of her 34 official trips, including in one of them a route of… 50 km, between Vienna and Bratislava.

Biden knows he has little leeway in Congress to apply $555,000M to climate change. In contrast, in the US, the fossil fuel sectors have received $3B over the past six years. Interestingly, the same Biden facilitated a 900% increase in coal shipped to China while seeking to limit Russian and Qatari gas sales to replace them with shale gas, the extraction of which is an environmental crime![2]. Years ago, we observed in a National Geographic article a very strange situation… In a place close to one of these extractions, in the USA, when a burning match approached from the water that came out of a tap, the liquid produced small flames.

Some three years ago, 300,000 commercial aircraft circulated daily, in addition to the totally nefarious and useless exercises carried out in the context of military manoeuvres. In addition to other specific operations with a useful purpose, between the military, in Portugal, we only register as worthy the coordination carried out by Gouveia e Melo within the scope of covid 19.

Such a nourishing party in Glasgow seems to be destined to present a novelty — the creation of the first global tax (“carbon tax”) by the States, levied by the respective local mandarins, who will, of course, be responsible for transmitting this tax burden to the people.

Of course, this won't affect fossil fuel emporiums much; they are well aware that the automobile is the most loved element of families, who sacrifice themselves to have a vehicle available at their doorstep. Experience shows that the appreciation of the car is so great that the common people will accept, resignedly, to pay any increase in taxes that may encumber the ownership of a vehicle and its circulation. On the other hand, no one sane will believe that the political classes will override the interests of their national companies in the field of automobiles and fuel sales; imposing limitations and tax burdens on those who, by tradition, finance the dominant parties and their bosses.

The WHO, which has not been brilliant in combating the coronavirus, even with substantial financial support from Gates, presents, in times of COP26, a proposal to reduce accidents and deaths on the road that are guided, per year, respectively, in 50 and 1.3 millions of people (Global Plan for the Decade of Action for Road Safety). This plan aims to reduce speed limits to 30 km/h in urban areas, to 80 km/h in localities and to 100 km/h in motorways. According to the director of the WHO Department of Social Determinants of Health, Etienne Krug, the more than 50 M who have died on the roads since the invention of cars clearly outnumber those killed in the four years of World War I (20 M).

The dominant economic environment shows the focus on increasing profits, increasing production, exports, competition, inveterate consumption fostered by advertising; as well as in the reduction of the direct intervention of the workers, in the reduction of the production costs or, of the ratio of wages/profits. The WHO Plan, confronted with the real economic environment, would have to imply a profound change in the economic paradigm, in a political involvement barely visible in the global context of economist, of corrupt political classes captured by economic interests. Above all, it demands strong activism from the populations themselves in favour of the health and well-being of all, which would make evident the uselessness of the political classes, financed by the States and by entities with hidden interests; an alternative for the construction of effectively democratic models of political representation with the annulment of the existence of political oligarchies, such as those present at COP26.

2 - Against the irrationality inherent to capitalism? Not really…

The aforementioned elements point to profound changes to be developed in human mobility, both in long distances and in current, short-distance movements and, above all, in commuting to home/work, especially when accompanied by triangular paths involving schools or nurseries. The solutions contemplate the reduction of time and dimension of the home/work routes through public transport, without emission of gases and, to the detriment and discrimination of car transport when, in addition, with the driver as the only passenger. And, one could go even further, mixing workplaces with residential areas in order to reduce commuting routes on transport or even cover these routes on foot.

It is completely irrational to spend an inordinate amount of time in public transport, full of people, with the air saturated and bottled up in traffic, in the well-known stop-and-go; it is irrational to spend a considerable amount of time in an endless line of cars, idling, releasing toxic gases into the atmosphere, in the morning and at the end of the afternoon, passing through a school or kindergarten; The low investment in electricity-powered rail routes is irrational: it is irrational to build huge buildings with several dwellings per floor, with elevator costs and little space for parking, even if free and not subject to payment to a local authority or a company. The constant increase in urban and suburban areas always comes before careful planning of the transport network; and these end up adapting to the layout of the streets, available to the buildings, without any planning or rationality on the part of municipalities mined with shady business between mandarins and property developers.

The concentration of economic activities in urban areas, sometimes gigantic, constantly attracts population, contributing to the depletion of rural areas, with little economic activity and reduced sanitary coverage, adjusted for an ageing population, with deserted villages and closed houses, when not in accelerated degradation. That is, a dichotomous and regressive occupation of the territory.

Clean energies fall into two groups.

Some require heavy and expensive infrastructure, operating in a contractual, market logic, between producers and consumers, with the inevitable presence of an increased tax burden to feed political classes, always eager to use the state machine, not retreating from favours and other acts corrupt. They are based on mercantile logic and tend to be invasive – wind towers, hectares covered with solar panels, requiring transport networks with inherent losses along the way.

The second version consists of the easy adaptation to a family house or a group of tenants in a medium-sized building, capable of production for self-consumption; without tax, but with partial interference from large electrical companies, in periods of low production. In Portugal, the intervention of the troika in 2013/15 introduced a 23% VAT rate, the same one used for sumptuous consumptions and for necessities, such as electricity consumed in homes; this situation is inside the action of a predatory State, collecting an immeasurable tax burden and revealing a reality in which taxes can be created, maintained but rarely reduced. And, when reduced, it is because of compensation in another tax.

The lightness of the political classes in the face of the situation associated with the contempt for the human multitude on the part of the capitalists, especially the powerful, such as Bezos[3] or Gates; or from inept politicians like Biden or Boris. Fearful of any more harmful attitude to their important carcasses, they only feel safe, in the company of their peers, always surrounded by police and security guards.

The problem in today's world is that smart people are

full of  doubts and idiot people are full of certainty

The common press lives in a concubinage relationship with the political class; together they constitute a pair of entertainers from the crowd. Members of the political class need the media to constantly divulge their abilities, their speeches, their presence in public places, the applause of the bastards; and, vice versa, the media, in order to sell the advertising that pays the costs, unfolds itself in the collection and dissemination of opinions, promises, criticisms of the opposition, by the mandarins; the more tense a political dispute, the more the subject matters to the media. Political class and press constitute two osmotic worlds where emptiness, lies, is the main elements placed in the press in general or, broadcast on TV, for the more media, 24 hours a day, interspersed with contests, idiotic series or full of violence and football; and, in the latter case, it is a matter of extremely narrow effective content, made up of exacerbated rivalries and conflicts, between managers eager for money from player transfers.

It is evident that the capitalists and the political classes have always been light-hearted in the face of transformations that lead, all over the place, to poor air quality, diseases, exhausting displacements within urban areas, exhaustion, and poisoning of agricultural soils, etc. everything, following its productivism, its eagerness for the growth of the GDP or, the accumulation of capital, if you prefer…

To say lightness is, in fact, very… light. Both groups — capitalists and political classes — are fierce defenders of the so-called free market, even if its operation, in the main business areas, has been controlled by companies or oligopolies of enormous size and power. The drive for a constant valuation of securities on the stock exchanges dominates the large global emporiums, and this drive has repercussions on the lower levels of business. On the other hand, this valuation incorporates billions of fictitious currency units, so that said financial markets are always expanding. And, governments follow the same logic by that dazzle people, taking as their objective the infinite growth of the GDP, covering up, in between, the stagnation or the weak evolution of real income from work[4].

As for global warming, the subject will drop off the agenda when the Glasgow meeting closes. Capitalists and their peers will continue to show a reasonable disinterest, more focused on the appreciation of securities on the stock market. And, the political classes will keep global warming on the agenda, on a low heat, as a way of putting pressure on governments. As for the ecological groups, they become parties like the others, like the German Greens, entering the German government, as years ago in the war in the former Yugoslavia; or, they are content to present creative technologies to postpone the moment of a massive collapse, without touching the global model of capitalist management or even the representational model, oligarchic and authoritarian.

 

The perfect dictatorship will have the appearances of democracy, a prison without walls in which prisoners will not even dream of escaping. A system of slavery where, thanks to consumption and entertainment, slaves will love slavery

This and other texts in:

http://grazia-tanta.blogspot.com/

http://www.slideshare.net/durgarrai/documents                                

https://pt.scribd.com/uploads

 


[1] Has Greta learned that there is no constructive dialogue with the top names of the political class? We recall her (useless) meeting a couple of years ago with Obama, the promoter of the wars of destruction in Libya, Syria and Iraq; the same Obama who appears with the purity of a dove, at the conclave of COP26, as he presented  himself as a dove of peace, deserving the Nobel, just before deciding to invade Libya , proceeding with the destructuring of West Asia and validating the coup d'etat in Egypt to bring dictator al-Sisi to power. 

[2] The factual elements contained in the previous paragraphs are mostly from https://informacaoincorrecta.com (G20 and COP26: WYSIWYG)  

[3] Bezos hasn't found anything smarter than paying a fortune for a four-minute suborbital ride https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/jeff-bezos-space-flight-money-better-uses/ 

[4] The Portuguese Prime Minister recently proposed an increase, for 2022, of the minimum wage, from €700 to €705, ie +0.71%, which is below the expected inflation (0.9%). It is about the misery of a Portugal of the little ones.

domingo, 4 de abril de 2021

Demography in Europe - a world of inequalities (2015-2020)

 In 2007, in the Lisbon Treaty, with pomp and circumstance, territorial and social cohesion was promised within the EU. In 2021, demographic discrepancies remain enormous and permanent.

Summary

1 - Demography reflects the capitalist drift and its promoters

2 - Demographic trends in the European regions

3 - The enduring demographic inequalities

4 - Permanent internal regional inequalities

+++++ |||||||||| +++++

1 - Demography reflects the capitalist drift and its promoters

Observation of the directions and values of the population evolution of a nation-state or region, included in one of the first, reveals quite clearly the relationship of population with the territory, and particularly with its ruling classes and its indigenous capitalists. It is evident that a political class with a predisposition for corruption and patronage takes the population like a herd to be sheared on a regular basis, compelling it to remain submissive and undemanding of decent incomes and dignified living conditions, in order to please multinationals or unqualified and clumsy local businessmen with a vocation for slavery. In order to attract "foreign investment" and be competitive in the global arena, the struggle of all against all is in force.

On the other hand, the political class of a richer country, with a shortage of less qualified or worse paid workers, will use immigrants as a way of containing salaries and rights; and will know how to keep the threat of expulsion, fear and submission at tolerable levels, managing the anathema launched by local nationalists, racists and fascists, so as not to provoke an exodus.

In the context of the neoliberal drift, a territory and its population are mere products, more or less competitive, like coffee machines or bananas; if they are more competitive, birth rates will be higher, the age profile will be balanced, it will welcome people coming from less competitive areas of the same nation-state, from countries near or even very far. Migration, especially from distant places, is not easy for the newcomers, who are confronted with an unknown language, different habits, low salaries, more difficult and poorly paid work, authoritarianism and animosity from local chauvinist, racist and fascist groups.

The Lisbon Treaty (2007), with pomp and circumstance, introduced the concept of territorial cohesion. This means that the respective populations can and are able to take advantage of their territory's particular characteristics to generate employment and decent wages for their inhabitants; so that their work effort produces "a more balanced and sustainable development" to use the patois of the bureaucrats. As it will be quantified later on, the inequalities in the European framework are profound, in terms of quality of life and income, the desertification of huge areas, the migrations that accentuate inequalities and generate ethnic animosities and xenophobia that follow the growth of GDP in some places and entropy and abandonment in others. Covid, beyond its inherent action, has come across the inability of the political classes to manage the presence of the virus, more than a year after the outbreak of the crisis; except in the confinements, teleworking, layoffs, inappropriate use of police forces, etc.

The Treaty also says (Article 176) that the European Regional Development Fund will contribute to the correction of imbalances; which, fourteen years later, is slow to show results. The result is xenophobic and fascistic attitudes; stale nationalisms and patriotisms that have been capturing conservative electorates; and throwing the so-called left-wingers into a past decrepitude, since they do not know any better.

2 – Demographic developments in European regions

About five years ago, we observed the demographic evolution in Europe, detailing the analysis to NUT - 2 regions, from 1990 to the period 2010/15. Five years later, we intend to make a similar analysis for the period 2015/20, comparing it with the previous five-year period and, of course, observing the changes that have occurred in the meantime. In graphical form, the following maps show, for the purposes of comparison, the evolution between the periods 2010/2015 and 2015/2020. 

The observation of the following two maps, with the demographic variations for the two decades, shows several compact patches of areas with demographic expansion as well as population regression.


In 2010/15 there are four large patches with population declines below -1% (red) - one covers most of the Iberian Peninsula; another covers substantial parts of Germany; a third extends from Poland to the Gulf of Finland; and a final patch covers the Balkans and Hungary, although it should be noted that data is not available for several countries, including Greece.

The regions with a population decline between 0 and -1% in 2010/15 are two broad areas; in the western part of Germany and a territorial band extending from the westernmost part of Poland southwards to Slovakia, as well as isolated regions in several countries.

In 2015/20, the Iberian area with a population decline of less than 1% is centred on Western Iberia, thus reducing in relation to the previous five-year period; the German territory with a population decline of less than -1% is substantially reduced and, on the other hand, the entire Western Italian territory from the Swiss border to the south, including the islands, shows clear population decline; in the Balkans the situation is unchanged even though data for almost the entire region is now available; finally, the population decline previously seen in Poland and the Baltic countries is spreading through Finland and densifying southwards.

Looking at the regions where population growth was positive but less than 2% in 2010/15 reveals several territorial concentrations. One is prominent on French territory; another is broadly spread between the Czech Republic and the Adriatic, including parts of Austria and Northern Italy. There are also important areas in Southern Italy, Poland, Western parts of the English coast, Scotland and finally the shores of the Gulf of Bothnia, Swedish and Finnish territories.

Looking at the same level of population development for 2015/20, there is an enlargement in the área, comprising the north of England and Scotland, the northern regions of Norway and Sweden, and also in the south-western area of Germany, as well as several smaller areas, mainly in Spain, northern Italy, Poland or the Czech Republic.

Robust population growth (2-5 per cent) in 2010/15 covers several areas. One is southern and western France; another stretches from Italy (Lazio) to southern Germany; a third covers the whole of southern England; and it also covers southern Sweden, Iceland and Belgium.

Taking the same parameter for the 2015/20 period, a vast, homogeneous zone should be highlighted, starting in Navarre and Catalonia, crossing southern France and reaching southern Germany and almost all of Austria. Other, smaller areas are observed in England, on the North Sea coast and on the Norwegian coast; and, in addition to large areas of Turkey.

In the first half decade, the situations of demographic growth above 5% present the largest territorial areas in southern Norway, in the areas of Stockholm and Helsinki; in the areas of Geneva, central Switzerland (including Zurich); in Languedoc-Roussillon and Corsica in France; in Lazio, Luxembourg and in the areas of London and Prague. On the map, the most extensive area of strong demographic dynamism is in Turkey.

In the 2015/20 approach we have separated cases of population growth between 5 and 10%, from those where it is more than 10%. The latter cases are very few - Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Greek islands of the North Aegean sea (near Asia Minor) and some regions of Turkey.

With regard to situations of demographic growth of 5 to 10% over the period, the most extensive are in southern Scandinavia, Ireland, Corsica, the Balearic Islands and Turkey: in addition to the most dynamic Swiss regions (Geneva and Zurich), city-centric or urban areas such as Berlin, Leipzig, Prague, Vienna, Bratislava, Hamburg, Bremen, Budapest, Madrid and Helsinki stand out.

3 - Lasting demographic inequalities

The evolution portrayed in the various five-year periods since 1990 shows (table below) the values corresponding to the total population of the countries with demographic reduction. Their number remains relatively constant, with a higher period in 2010/15, resulting from the inclusion of Germany, Spain and Estonia, which is no longer the case in the most recent five-year period; Italy, on the other hand, showed a negative indicator in the last period. These situations are easily revealed in the two maps presented above. The situation in 2015/20 shows, for the first time, a reduction in the volume of the populations assigned to these countries with decreasing populations. 

Countries with decreasing population (EU)*


1995/

1990

2000/

1995

2005/

2000

2010/

2005

2015/

2010

2020/

2015

9

10

10

9

12

10

Population (1000)

66049

103189

104190

168365

234261

162802

%  of total EU

13,7

21,2

21,1

33,5

46,2

31.7

  All the períods – Bulgária, Estónia, Croácia, Letónia, Lituânia, Hungria e Roménia

  In 5 periods  - Polónia, except 1995/90

  In 3 períods – Rep. Checa (the first three);

  In 2 períods – Eslovénia (first two); Alemanha; Portugal e Grécia (last two)

  In one períod – Eslováquia (2005/2000); Espanha (2010/15); Itália (2015/20)

  * With a decreasing population in the last two five-year periods (not EU members) – Sérvia, Albânia; e, Montenegro (2015/20)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

We then proceed to distribute the EU countries - and others in the European area - according to the average figures for population growth (in %) over the two five-year periods:

Decreasing

Weak growth <1)

  Medium growth (1-5)

  High growth (>5)


2015/

2020

2010/

2015


2015/

2020

2010/

2015


2015/

2020

2010/

2015


2015/

2020

2010/

2015

 

Lituânia

-4.4

-7.0

Monteneg.


0.5

P. Baixos

3.0

2.0

Suíça

 

5.8

Croácia

-4.0

-1.8

Eslováquia

0.7

0.6

Finlândia


2.3

Malta

17.0

6.2

Letónia

-4.0

-6.3

Rep. Checa


0.7

Dinamarca

2.9

2.3

Noruega

 

6.4

Bulgária

-3.5

-3.0

Eslovénia


0.8

Itália


2.7

Turquia

7.0

7.1

Roménia

-2.7

-2.1

Macedón.N

0.3

0.8

França

1.3

2.8

Luxemb.

11.2

12.1

Sérvia

-2.6

-2.6

Finlândia

0.98


Áustria

3.7

2.8

Suécia

6.0


Itália

-1.9


UE

0.8

0.7

Irlanda


2.8

Irlanda

6.1


Albânia

-1.4

-1.1




Chipre

4.8

3.4

Islândia

10.7


Grécia

-1.3

-2.4




Islândia


3.6


 


Hungria

-0.9

-1.6




Bélgica

2.5

3.7


 


Portugal

-0.8

-1.9




GB

2.8

3.8


 


Polónia

-0.1

-0.05




Liechtenst.

3.7

4.1


 


Monteneg.

-0.04





Suécia


4.4


 


Estónia


-1.4




Estónia

1.1



 


Alemanha


-0.7




Rep. Checa

1.5



 


Espanha


-0.1




Eslovénia

1.6



 








Espanha

1.9



 








Alemanha

2.4



 








Noruega

3.9



 








Suíça

4.5



 
















Nota:  Non-EU country members (letters in italics )                                      Eurostat     

Within the EU, 20 countries do not change the scale of their demographic dynamics, 9 of which have consolidated population decline, while another 9 show demographic growth in both periods, which reveals the great and persistent inequalities within the EU. It also reveals that Community funds are far from generating homogeneity and equality of living conditions, as can also be seen in the maps herein inserted. In fact, to admit that a homogeneity in living conditions between the various regions of Europe is a serious and persistent objective is a litany that appears in the speeches of the political classes and eurocrats, to numb and deceive the people; the reality portrayed in the maps easily shows that “the king has no clothes”.

The number of situations of demographic decline is almost equal in both periods, with greater homogeneity in the most recent period where the most serious cases are between -4.4 and -2.6% of population reduction, much lower than in the most recent five-year period, especially for Lithuania and Latvia. As mentioned above, for both periods, and as can be seen on the maps, the cases of greater population decline are located in the Baltic and in the Balkans. In 2010/15, Germany, Spain and Portugal were the only countries with demographic decline in Western Europe and, in the following period only Italy and Portugal were in this situation, which certainly dragged into the last period the wounds generated during the "healing" intervention of the regulatory institutions (IMF, ECB ...).

Capitalism  has not  equality, between nation-states or between people, as its brand image; on the contrary, inequality allows the choice of the cheapest, the most precarious, the most submissive, because it results in greater margins of capital accumulation and greater competition among those who depend on their labour to live, even if only poorly. Decades ago, the demand for cheaper labour was limited to the rural areas of the same country (Portugal in the 1950s, for example); then it spread to nearby countries (Portuguese, Spanish, Maghreb emigrants to France or Yugoslavs to Germany in the 1970s);and, more recently, in an intercontinental framework, with Latin Americans and Africans throughout Europe, Philippins in the Persian Gulf monarchies and, tutti-quanti in the USA, especially Latin Americans, honoured with an electrified and guarded Wall, which was one of the great flags raised by Trump. As a rule, homogeneity in the populating of territories does not exist and is a potential frustration for those who believe in human rationality applied to planning, territorial cohesion and other beautiful melodies sung by the political classes.

Germany, Estonia and Spain are the only countries that have moved from a population decline in 2010/15 to population growth rates, with Italy in the opposite direction. The following chart shows five-year changes in population for all countries in Europe, in alphabetical order.

We highlight in the following graph, some situations:

·       Some countries show a population growth of more than 5% in 2010/15 - Luxembourg and Malta  - both close to tax havens and both, EU members; and also Norway, or the European vault (Switzerland). Turkey is a special case at a time of geopolitical assertion among Muslim countries in its vicinity, after the cessation of hopes of an EU integration. An integration of a country with the population of Germany, with a Muslim population  and, with "competitive" wages was not well regarded in Europe.

·       With a population growth of more than 5% in 2015/20, Luxembourg, Malta and Turkey will remain, to be joined by Ireland, Iceland and Sweden.

·       The most notable cases of population decline in 2015/20 are Lithuania, Latvia, Serbia, Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Portugal, whose situations are broadly unchanged from the previous five-year period.

 

The inequalities expressed in the above table for European nation-states can be further detailed by considering information on the population-dropping regions in each country for various points in time over the past 25 years. The resulting profile is as follows:

EU regions with falling populations in the five-year period ending in the year in question

 

Total de regions

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

Bélgica (11)

1

1

-

-

-

-

Bulgária (6)

6

6

6

6

6

6

Rep Checa (8)

nd

6

7

1

3

3

Dinamarca (5)

-

-

-

-

1

-

Alemanha (36)

5

11

12

25

25

4

Estónia (1)

1

1

1

1

1

-

Irlanda (2)

nd

nd

-

-

1

-

Grécia (4) (a) (13 em 2020)


1



2

9

Espanha (19) (b)

5

5

2

-

11

8

França (22)

2

5

1

1

3

10

Croácia (2)

nd

nd

nd

1

2

2

Itália (19) (c )

7

11

7

3

2

16

Chipre (1)

-

-

-

-

-

-

Letónia (1)

1

1

1

1

1

1

        Lituânia (1) ( 2 em 2020)

1

1

1

1

1

1

Luxemburgo (1)

-

-

-

-

-

-

        Hungria (7) ( 8 em 2020)

3

7

7

6

6

6

Malta (1)

-

-

-

-

-

-

Holanda (12)

-

-

1

1

4

1

Áustria (9)

-

3

1

1

1

-

        Polónia (16) (17 em 2020)

nd

12

10

9

11

8

Portugal (7)

nd

2

1

3

6

6

Roménia (8)

7

7

8

7

7

7

Eslovénia (1)

1

1

-

-

-

-

Eslováquia (4)

-

-

3

2

2

2

Finlândia (5)

-

1

1

1

-

2

Suécia (8)

-

5

3

3

-

-

     G Bretanha (35)

6

10

2

-

1

1

Total UE (252)

46

97

75

73

97

93









                  (a) Data for only 4 of the 13 Greek regions which held around 46% of the total population

 

4 - Internal regional inequalities

The observation in the previous table for a 25-year period can be complemented with information on all the regions with high population decline in Europe (2000/2020) and using the designations of the regions as they are referred to in their countries. We have also made a calculation of population changes in 2000/2020. (%)

 

 

                                                          (%)                                                             (%)

Bulgária

-15,1


Grécia

-0,5

 Severozapaden

-32,7


Attiki

-3,4

Severen tsentralen

-26,7


Dytiki Makedonia

-7,8

Severoiztochen

-9,9


Ipeiros

-1,3

Yugoiztochen

-15,3


Thessalia

-3,3

Yugozapaden

-2,3


Ipeiros

-1,3

Yuzhen tsentralen

-16,5


Peloponnisos

-2,3

Redução populacional

(país) 2000/2020

   1239 mil


Redução populacional

(país) 2000/2020

    57 mil

 

Estónia

-5.2


     Irlanda

31,4

Estónia

-5.2


Irlanda

31,4

Redução populacional

(país) 2000/2020

     72 mil


Aumento populacional (país) 2000/2020

 1187 mil

 

 

França

1.3


Letónia

-19,9

Centre - Val de Loire

-0.5


Letónia

-19,9

Aumento populacional

 (país) 2000/2020

 6775 mil


Redução populacional

(país) 2000/2020

474 mil

 

Eslováquia

1.1


Rep Checa

4.1

Západné Slovensko

-2,8


Severozápad

-0,7

Stredné Slovensko

-1,4


Strední Morava

-0.5

Aumento populacional

(país) 2000/2020

59 mil


Aumento populacional

(país) 2000/2020

   416 mil

 

Áustria

11,2


Lituânia

-20,4

Áustria

11,2


Vidurio ir vakaru Lietuvos regionas

-21,6

Aumento populacional

(país) 2000/2020

899 mil


Redução populacional (país) 2000/2020

718 mil

 

Alemanha

1.2


Portugal

0,5

Chemnitz (2015/2020)

-2.5


Norte

-2,1

Sachsen-Anhalt

-17.1


Centro

-4,8

Thüringen

-12.9


Alentejo

-9,1

Aumento populacional (país) 2000/2020

1003 mil


Aumento populacional

(país) 2000/2020

47 mil

 

Malta

32,4


Chipre

28,6

Malta

32,4


Chipre

28,6

Aumento populacional

(país) 2000/2020

126 mil


Aumento populacional

 (país) 2000/2020

198 mil

 

Luxemburgo

44,4


Países Baixos

3,0

Luxemburgo

44,4


Limburg

-2,1

Aumento populacional

(país) 2000/2020

193 mil


Aumento populacional

(país)  2000/2020

1544 mil

 

Suécia

16,6


Finlândia

6,9

Mellersta Norrland

-1,0


Pohjois-ja Itä-Suomi

-2,8

Aumento populacional

(país) 2000/2020

1466 mil


Aumento populacional

 (país) 2000/2020

354 mil

 

 

 

Eslovénia

5,4


Liechtenstein

19,5

Eslovénia

5,4


Liechtenstein

19,5

Aumento populacional

(país) 2000/2020

108 mil


Aumento populacional

(país) 2000/2020

  6 mil

 

Suíça

20,1


Reino Unido

13,4

Suíça

20,1


Reino Unido

13,4

Aumento populacional

(país) 2000/2020

1442 mil


Aumento populacional

(país) 2000/2020

7852 mil

 

Polónia

-0,8


Hungria

-0,9

 

Slaskie

-6,4


Közép-Dunántúl

-5,2

 

Zachodniopomorskie

-1,5


Nyugat-Dunántúl

-1,0

 

Lubuskie

-0,7


Dél-Dunántúl

-12,5

 

Dolnoslaskie

-1,8


Észak-Magyarország

-14,3

 

Opolskie

-12,3


Észak-Alföld

-7,8

 

Kujawsko-Pomorskie

-0,9


Dél-Alföld

-11,0

 

Warminsko-Mazurskie

-1,8


Redução  populacional 

(país) 2000/2020

 452 mil

 

Lódzkie

-1,9




Swietokrzyskie

-2,3




Lubelskie

-1,8


Albânia

-7,0

 

Podlaskie

-1,1


   Veri

-5,1

 

Mazowiecki regionalny

-1,3


   Jug

-6,7

 

Redução populacional (país) 2000/2020

305 mil


 Redução populacional

(país) 2000/2020

213 mil

 









 

Itália

4,8

 

 

 

Liguria

-4,0

 

Roménia

-13,9

Molise

-6,9

 

Nord-Vest

-10,6

Campania

-0,1

 

Centru

-12,5

Puglia

-2,0

 

Nord-Est

-16,7

Basilicata

-8,0

 

Sud-Est

-19,0

Calabria

-6,6

 

Sud - Muntenia

-16,4

Sicília

-2,4

 

Sud-Vest Oltenia

-20,5

Sardegna

-1,6

 

Vest

-13,4

Aumento populacional

(país) 2000/2020

2718 mil

 

Redução populacional

(país) 2000/2020

  452 mil

 

 

 

 

Sérvia

-8,0




Region Vojvodine

-1,5


Espanha

17,0

 

Region Sumadije i Zapadne Srbije

-2,5


Asturias

-4,6

 

Region Juzne i Istocne Srbije

-3,0


Castilla y León

-2,9

 

Redução populacional

(país) 2000/2020

601 mil


Aumento populacional (país)   2000/2020

 6862 mil

 








 

Noruega

19,9


Islândia

30,5

Noruega

19,5


Islândia

30,5

Aumento populacional

(país) 2000/2020

889 mil


Aumento populacional

(país) 2000/2020

  85 mil

 

Montenegro

3,1


Turquia

24,3

Montenegro

3,1


Agri, Kars, Igdir, Ardahan

-1,5

Aumento populacional

 (país) 2000/2020

  19 mil


Aumento populacional

(país) 2000/2020

16266 mil

 

Macedónia do Norte

2,7


Bélgica

12,5

Macedónia do Norte

2,7


Bélgica

12,5

Aumento populacional (país) 2000/2020

55 mil


Aumento populacional

(país)    2000/2020

1283 mil

 

Croácia

-9.8




Jadranska Hrvatska

-1.4


Dinamarca

9.2

 

Kontinentalna Hrvatska

-8.0


Dinamarca

9.2

 

Redução populacional (país) 2000/2020

 440 mil


Aumento populacional (país) 2000/2020

493 mil

 































 Note:  Redução populacional (país) = Population reduction (country)

            Aumento populacional (país) = Population increase (country)

           493  mil =  493 thousands

Community funds aim to provide favourable conditions for investors and, to a lesser extent, to prevent the massive migrations that take place in Europe and which include, as elements that generate "competitiveness", the acceptance of workers from Africa, Asia or Latin America, with discriminatory rules, lower incomes, more difficult tasks and always with the threat of expulsion; and many thousands of those who arrive in Europe every day do so clandestinely and even at the risk of their lives. The unhumanitarian acceptance of "illegal immigrants" and refugees, humiliated and persecuted by the repellent agency of capital called Frontex[1], only serves to accentuate this humiliation, obedience, precariousness and low labour costs, since companies established in Europe are obliged to be competitive, as stated in the missal of capitalism, especially the neoliberal way.

On demographic inequalities in the world, Europe and Portugal, see:

The evolution of wealth in Europe (2000/19)

https://grazia-tanta.blogspot.com/2020/08/a-evolucao-da-riqueza-na-europa-200019.html

https://grazia-tanta.blogspot.com/2020/08/the-evolution-of-wealth-in-europe-200019_6.html?m=1   english)

 

Desigualdades na dinâmica demográfica na Península Ibérica (1990/2019)

https://grazia-tanta.blogspot.com/2020/07/desigualdades-na-dinamica-demografica.html

 

Como se consolidam as desigualdades através do tempo

https://grazia-tanta.blogspot.com/2020/02/como-se-consolidam-as-desigualdades.html

https://grazia-tanta.blogspot.com/2020/04/how-inequalities-are-consolidated-over.html   (english)

 

Comércio internacional – quem ganha e quem perde

 https://grazia-tanta.blogspot.com/2019/03/comercio-internacional-quem-ganha-e.html

 

Center and peripheries in Europe (3) - Portugal, an Iberian periphery

https://grazia-tanta.blogspot.com/2018/10/centre-and-peripheries-3-portugal.html  (english)

http://grazia-tanta.blogspot.pt/2016/06/centro-e-periferias-3-portugal-uma.html

Center and peripheries in Europe (2) - Portugal, a case of peripheral disaster

https://grazia-tanta.blogspot.com/2018/10/center-and-peripheries-in-europe-2.html  (english)

http://grazia-tanta.blogspot.pt/2016/06/centro-e-periferias-3-portugal-uma.html

 

Center and peripheries in Europe - The dynamics of inequalities since 1990

https://grazia-tanta.blogspot.com/2018/10/center-and-peripheries-in-europe.html   (english)

http://grazia-tanta.blogspot.pt/2016/04/centro-e-periferias-na-europa-dinamica.html

 

Evolution of the world population 1950/2050 - The case of Europe

http://grazia-tanta.blogspot.com/2018/07/evolution-of-world-population-19502050_16.html (english) https://grazia-tanta.blogspot.pt/2018/05/evolucao-da-populacao-mundial-19502050.html

 

Custos do trabalho na Europa – espelho da exploração e das desigualdades

https://grazia-tanta.blogspot.pt/2017/07/custos-do-trabalho-na-europa-espelho-da.html

 

Europa, periferias e desastres periféricos

http://grazia-tanta.blogspot.pt/2017/05/europa-periferias-e-desastres.html

 

União dos Povos da Europa ou o nacionalismo à solta

http://grazia-tanta.blogspot.pt/2016/09/uniao-dos-povos-da-europa-ou-o.html

https://grazia-tanta.blogspot.pt/2017/08/union-of-european-peoples-or.html  (english)

 

These and other documents, here:

http://grazia-tanta.blogspot.com/ 

http://www.slideshare.net/durgarrai/documents
 https://pt.scribd.com/uploads 



[1] Frontex is an expanded version of the Portuguese SEF which, following the murder of a Ukrainian immigrant by members of the institution, has since been dissolved; but whose members will be split between other police forces.