Abstract
1 - A decadent Europe
shows its decaying teeth
2 - A quick glance on the Pentagon/NATO's
last brave interventions
2.1 – Libya
2.2 – Iraq
2.3 – Afghanistan
2.4 – Syria
3 - What is left from tragedies and
comedies of the recent past?
4 - Iran , the rich target of the
Westerners
4.1 - Recent history of Western's
interventions in Iran
4.2 – The Iranian foreign relationships
matrix
4.3 - The Iranian nuclear programme
4.4 - The impact of the energy sanctions
dictated by EU
The Empire's
warlike manoeuvres in the Middle East
The geopolitical approach has an advantage the multidisciplinary
integration (geography, history, economics, cultures, demography…) and is the
one that allows for a global vision of the world.
Accordingly, although this text focuses in particular in the Middle East
and Iran ,
we will take into account that there are no closed regions from a geopolitics
point of view and that the planet is a communicating vessels' system, without
denying the regional or local particularities.
1 - A decadent Europe shows its
decaying teeth
To the enlightened European leaders, the absence of problems in Europe - where, as is well known, the welfare standards
are distinctly increasing - justifies the indefinite postponement of any
solution to minor problems such as the banking and state bankruptcies or the
economic recovery.
Therefore, they have plenty of time to dictate sanctions against Iran[1] following
their usual obedience of Washington's orders where - indeed - there is a
strategy for the whole world and in particular for the Middle East. Tuning to
the same strategic obtuseness, they reinvented on January 30 a discredited
formula to shackle the indebted EU countries to the provision of perennial
revenues to the financial system, thus avoiding bankruptcies amongst major
European banks. Stupidly, or to benefit major oil corporations, they contribute
to the rise in prices, without disclosing that Europe's relevance for the Iranian
exports is not that big, as will be seen below.
What
are they preparing? Probably, one more summit preceded by the customary meeting
of the "Merkosy" mishmash.
2 - A quick glance of the Pentagon/NATO's latest brave interventions
Let us look at a few notes on the most recent amongst all the
Western-led well-intentioned military interventions;
2.1 - Libya
News on Libya are coming through on a regular basis and they are not
reassuring - military conflicts, torture, dissents within the new power and people's actions against the transitional
government imposed in Libya by NATO through the democratic formula of bombing. After
the humanitarian Western intervention, how many of us would expecting the
Libyans still have not stopped praying as a token of gratitude for the Western
bombings? The real success of the U.S. “nation-building” strategy
will be seen in the near future, in addition to the appropriation of the
country's energy resources[2].
One less well reported aspect is that, following the end of Kaddafi's
age, the Tuareg troops merged into the Libyan army positioned themselves in Mali , demanding
the secession of that country's part inhabited by Tuareg tribes. This people
are indeed a Stateless nation (they have never had a State) and the borders
established by the colonial power are meaningless for them. The MNLA –
Mouvement National pour la Libération de l’Azawad (National Movement for the
Liberation of Azawad) has recently attacked/occupied various locations near the
Niger "curve" in Mali .
Given the weakness of the Malian army, it is no surprise that the
"counter-terrorist" plan - with which the U.S.
have involved Africa's governments in general and Sahel 's
government in particular within the past few years of AFRICOM's intense
activity - be implemented.
2.2 - Iraq
Late in 2011, the U.S. and their eager faithful left Iraq – leaving
behind the customary "consultants" of the local army – a ballast of
over 1 M civilian deaths and the massive destruction of the country's infrastructures; these are the usual collateral issues - as
used in NATO's jargon - to pacify the country. However, bombs continue to
explode and to create victims[3].
This withdrawal, despite not ending the military presence or reducing the
strategic Middle East’s relevance for the U.S. , demonstrates, in essence,
failures and non achieved objectives.
A number of relevant notes can be drawn from the invasion and later
occupation of Iraq by the U.S. and their appendages - all of them anxious
to leave the scene from very early – in order to approach the present Western posture
against Iran and Syria :
a) Let us remember the choir of the Western leaders and their conductor,
the famous George W. Bush, all of them assuring to have incontrovertible
evidence of the existence of weapons of massive destruction in Iraq . It has
been confirmed that such weapons were non-existent but what actually existed
was its role as central argument in a rough propaganda move. The argument against
Iran
on weapons of massive destruction - or a similar line of argumentation - will
certainly not benefit from the same support as in 2003. However, it is always
possible to buy or enlist in the U.N. a few faithful such as the Marshall Islands
or the dutiful minister Portas* to participate in any circus show.
b) The promise of establishing a democracy - even a market democracy - has
failed abysmally. To Saddam's authoritarian and corrupt regime succeeded a more
diverse mandarinate – but no less corrupt - which, immediately after the U.S.
invasion, knew how to make the best - the worse for Iraqis – of the U.S. funding
and aids. The example intended to be shown to regimes and peoples of the Middle
East, namely that of the joys of market democracy, with the abandonment of the
military or feudal authoritarianism, had no followers; the changes in Tunisia
and Egypt were essentially the result of the strenuous fight of the crowd
against the dictators and in no case was Iraq the inspiration;
c) The result of the intervention in Iraq did not, in the end diminished
the anti-American and anti-Western antipathy feelings in Muslim countries. Afghanistan is
still occupied and Pakistanis despise the regime of the corrupt Zardari and of
the military, business men and torturers. The Arab monarchies continue calmly
and quietly with their manifestations of authoritarianism, repression and
denial of civil and political rights of the population. Palestinians continue
to be the subject of plunder of their land and their property at the hands of a
racist sect that operates as a Cerebrus guarding Western interests, especially
energy interests, in the Middle East ;
d) The presence of American military in the Persian Gulf and on Arab lands
began in 1991 following the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam. Once the Iraqis were kicked out of
"their" 19th Province, the U.S. allowed the continuation of Saddam,
with limited sovereignty, with no-fly zones and sanctions which hit the
population hard; it is quite clear that the presence of the U.S. would continue
on the argument of supervisioning Iraq, containment of its leader who, even
weakened, functioned as a false threat to Kuwait or to Saudi Arabia;
e) The invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and thereafter, of Iraq (2003) were
all forms of perpetuating the American presence in the Middle East which,
meanwhile, spread on account of the "terrorist" threat, of Al-Qaeda
and for the sake of the containment of Iran. Now, with the withdrawal from Iraq and, from Afghanistan , in the nearest future,
new threats need to be designated to justify the presence in oil lands and in
oil transit routes to rival countries. The
U.S. is creating a military posture composed of 32 bases in the Persian Gulf
region[4] where
Seeb, Thumrait and Masirah stand out in Oman, Al-Ubeid in Qatar, the command of
the 5th fleet in Bahrain, near Manama and Camp Arifjan or Camp Doha in Kuwait;
2.3 - Afghanistan
The U.S. have been there since 2001, when they invaded the country on
the pretext of capturing Bin Laden and his host, Mullah Omar, the governor of the
fundamentalist Taliban, rulers of the country at the time. Obama announced his
intention to withdraw from the country in 2014, leaving it to the care of his
dependable man, Karzai, linked to CIA and a former employee of an American oil
company, Unocal, meanwhile integrated into Chevron.
Karzai's regime is characterized by corruption and electoral fraud to
which the American tutelage closed its eyes to favour its ward. It is the U.S. military
presence that guarantees that instability does not degenerate into chaos and
allows for Chinese and Indian investments. However,
it appears that the three million refugees in Pakistan
and Iran
do not trust that the Pax Americana will continue.
The mountainous nature of the terrain and the difficulties of movement
and travelling make ethnic and political differences more evident in a rural
society with strong patriarchal traditions and tribal, linguistic or ethnic
links that foster the existence of armed militias and warlords. The war and the strategic position promoted a flourishing
activity of opium cultivation and traffic which has caused serious social
damage, but which is used for financing the warlord’s weaponry.
As is clear, the fight against terrorism and the punishment of Bin Laden
was a false argument to invade Afghanistan
in 2001 but it was enough to further a patriotic and avenging wave in the U.S. as well as
to justify the infringement of rights and an anti-Islamic phobia that became an
export product. Later on, in 2008, the candidate Obama would refer to the
underdeveloped Afghanistan , landlocked
in Asia and with no outlets to the sea, as the real threat to U.S. security!
Several factors explain this obsession for Afghanistan or
derive from it:
a) The presence in Afghanistan
is a direct threat to Iran, the largest U.S. military base being
located in Shindand, 100 km from the common border, although the
logistics centre of the U.S. military apparatus is in Bagram, to the north of Kabul;
b) On a proactive trend, the U.S. tried to use Afghanistan to carry the immense energy resources from Turkmenistan
and Kazakhstan to the Indian
Ocean, thus removing them from traffic routes dependent on Russia and at the same time without passing
through Iran .
This Project failed completely, as
explained further ahead.
c) Just like the Soviets in the '80s, the
Americans did not study the failure of the British in Afghanistan , in the 19th century; and they forgot the cultural proximity of the
Pashtun from both sides of the artificial border with Pakistan (itself, another "brilliant"
British creation to divide its Indies Empire). Consequently, the political and
social instability worsened in Pakistan
in a way that is likely to provoke conflicts with India ;
d) The poppy cultivation for the production
of heroin in Afghanistan (something like 93% of the
world production in 2007) occupies more land than the coca plantation in Latin America and generates $ 50000 M per year[5]. The
cultivation increased substantially since the defeat of the Taliban and it
plays a significant role in the Mafia-like world economy that forwards so much
capital to the finance system and the powerful Wall Street; both of them
operating to the discontent of the overwhelming majority of humanity. The
warlords work as guardians of the plantations, charging money for it under the
blessing of the U.S. .
This cultivation repeats what the U.S.
has done in the 1970s in Laos ,
in Cambodia and in Burma , where
CIA controlled heroin and opium to finance the American war against the Vietnamese
guerrillas;
e) The U.S. has already spent $ 438 000 M and
the British £ 18 000 M with the war in Afghanistan and it remains to be seen whether, after
their withdrawal, the settling of accounts between the various warlords, the
Taliban and Karzai will not bring the latter the faith of his predecessor Najibullah
who, in 1989, after the departure of the Soviets, was murdered with barbaric
sophistication.
2.4
– Syria
The Syria situation – despite all the ambiguity
of such designation, is presenting new episodes on a daily basis.
Where there is repression, there is
resistance. There is dissent in Syria but apparently it is unable to overthrow
the regime and the various social forces that support it: the Orthodox
Christians (4%), the Sunni oligarchs and Druses (3%), or the Armenians who
tolerate the Alawite power, a Shiite sect that represents 12% of the population
and guarantees it stability; and whose opinion will probably change when Bashar
will be falling. On the other hand, the predominance of the “Muslim Brothers” in
the contestation to Bashar does not attract many of those who prefer the
secularism of the Syrian regime to a Sunni based religious regime with the
imposition of the Koran’s rule.
a) Contrary to what has happened in Tunisia or in Egypt ,
where peaceful mass protests were (and still are) witnessed, in Syria and maybe
not only through desertions in the army, which were not relevant to break its
unity, the opposition has resorted to arms. From a strictly legal point of
view, this option justifies the brutal and heavy intervention against the
insurgents, moreover only armed with Kalashnikovs;
b) It is true that an armed insurrection,
without a strong support of the crowd, is always weak and it is bound to fail. Guevara paid with his life his romantic vision
of revolutions based on vanguards of heroes. Any guerrilla manual reflects Mao's
teaching “a revolutionary must be integral to the people as a fish is to the
water". In this sense, either the insurgents widen their popular support
to the point of isolating and dividing the present supporters of Bashar, or
they will be crushed; and it does not appear realistic that a military
intervention will take place in Syria as that observed in Libya, led by NATO;
c) In the Syrian opposition there are not many
adherents of an external military intervention to solve internal problems,
since the country has a rich history of humiliations, occupations and
aggressions, the most recent of which came from the Israeli entity. The Iraqi
and Libya cases have
showcased the altruistic aims of the Westerners; thus, the Western commitment
against Bashar does not give credibility to the opposition in Syria and
neither does the tension of their Turkish neighbours. Let us also remember that
the Ottoman Turkey ruled (the Great) Syria until the 1914/18 war; that the
French occupiers offered a slice of Syrian territory (the Sandjak of
Alexandretta, known today as Iskenderun) in 1939 in order to ensure the Turkish
neutrality in the world conflict of 1939/45. However, Turkey
refuses a foreign intervention and even the establishment of no-fly zones over Syria ;
d) There is a clear interest on the part of Russia (and China )
to curb Western urges against Syria .
Their acceptance of Resolution 1973 against Libya has been taken over and it
has been used as stepping stone for NATO's aggression against that
country. Once the war was over, the
redistribution of Libyan oil resources was carried out in favour of the
Westerners, in particular of the French and the British, to the detriment of
the continuity of Russian and Chinese business with Gaddafi. That is why both –
Russia and China – used their right of veto in the UN
Security Council on the proposal against Syria ,
on the past February 4; they surely do not want to see repeated in Syria the poor results obtained in Libya . As far as oil is concerned and in a world
thirsty for its consumption, despite the fact that Syria has no impressive
reserves when compared to Libya's (2500 million barrels against 46400 million
barrels), cannot be ignored;
e) On the other hand, Russia has a close relationship with Syria where it owns a naval base in Tartus, its
only permanent position in Mediterranean , a
remnant of the Soviet greatness. It is
not difficult to imagine that, after Bashar al-Assad's fall, a new power
created by the U.S. or
thankful for the role played by the U.S.
in the crusade for the "democratization" of Syria , will
request the Russians to abandon Tartus.
f)
Following this
veto, on February 6, the U.S.
withdrew its diplomatic staff from Damascus ,
while Obama said the problem could be solved without military intervention.
Interestingly, the Western market democracy regimes, in order to pressure the
fall of the dictatorial Syrian regime, use as supporters the Arab League
countries, the majority of which are dictatorships when they are not absolute
monarchies. In politics, gratitude is low valued; the Emir of Kuwait will have
forgotten that the Syria of Hafez al-Assad (Bashar's father) condemned, in
1990, the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam, although this and Hafez were the
paramount leaders of two sister parties, the Iraqi and the Syrian Baas;
g) A few years ago, Syria was the major obstacle to a project for
the building of pipelines between Turkey
(Ceyhan) and Israel
for oil, water and electricity transportation to the Zionist territory, since
it would necessarily have to pass through Syrian territorial waters. A change of regime in Damascus
could be a project enabler considering that Turkey
would ease its friction with Israel
which resulted from the Zionist military attack on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara in May 2010;
h) Also, Israel would be a great beneficiary
of political changes in Syria if the new power would accept in fact the
occupation of the Golan Heights in
exchange for business with Israel and, above all, if it would make life
difficult for Hezbollah in Lebanon or would allow for its isolation by limiting
the influence of Teheran in Lebanon;
i)
Finally, and
strategically, the democratic concern of the West over the regime in Damascus is essentially about the period of political and
military pressure against Iran ,
given the strong ties between Iran ,
Syria
and the Lebanese government.
3 - What is left from the tragedies and comedies of the recent past?
Intoxicated by the falling apart of dictatorships and of the
state-controlled capitalism in Russia
and Eastern Europe , the Westerners believed
that their political and social model would be easily transplanted to the
Muslim world and beyond. If not through a questionable moral superiority, at
least through manu militari which, in
between and with less media coverage, would help re-launching the powerful
military industry, resentful by the end of the Cold War[6].
The inevitability of the single neoliberal thought and of market
democracy propagated by the Westerners presents two appalling denials. On one
hand, China 's
economic growth reveals that a repressive regime is able to conciliate a
state-controlled capitalism with the private national or multinational
initiative and even to become the main driver of GDP growth or of the world
trade, becoming in parallel a financial power. On the other hand, the recessive
drift in terms of economy and rights, promoted by the neoliberal mania in the
West, causes
the Western model to lose credibility. If this model proves to lead to
unemployment and poverty, it cannot encourage the large masses of population of
the Islamic countries to make a simple copy of it, since their countries are
already suffering too much from those problems.
The memory of the colonial humiliations and the failed or sabotaged
attempts to repeat the Western path are lucidly perceived by the peoples as a
legacy of the colonial period. Finally, the existing barriers in the Western
countries to exports from other countries or to the entry of immigrants – the subject
of racist and discriminatory treatment - are not examples of individual or
collective solidarity for the resolution of underdevelopment and poverty
problems.
The great majority of the regimes existing in Islamic countries associate
with Western capital by coupling with the exclusive globalization system, thus
being both accomplices in maintaining poverty and the absence of rights as well
as in the repression of the peoples' claims all over the world and not only in
more or less emerging countries. Also in
2011, given the popular uprisings in Tunisia
and Egypt ,
the Westerners, with Hillary Clinton’s lead, expressed greater concern to
ensure an evolution in continuity of the authoritarian model than enthusiasm
for the liberating drive of the peoples.
The overwhelming military power of the Pentagon, of NATO and of their
allies proved to be, at times, insufficient to strategically win the wars in
which they get involved. Thus Israel did not manage to crush Hezbollah in 2006;
the U.S. was not able to establish a democratic regime and peace in Iraq, even
spending $ 1 trillion; and in Afghanistan the U.S. try to get out of the
quagmire in which they are involved, even if their opponents do not, by any means,
have their military, technological or financial power. In the end, when they
leave the scene, the Pentagon and NATO always leave behind metastases of
conflict, dictatorships, suffering and misery and it cannot be said that the
world has become more safe and happy after the military defeat of the successive
"rogue states".
The insistence on wars and invasions over the past
twenty years by the U.S.
and its allies, including the Israeli branch, does not contribute to the
preparation of negotiating formulas for conflict management. The
“nation-building” concept is based on racist attitudes of civilisation superiority
over the "indigenous", on contempt for their culture, their history,
their ethnic or religious diversity, relying only on the power of weapons to
crush the enemy and of money to buy mandarins for representing their
interests;
Although the attitudes of the vast majority of Islamic countries'
regimes towards Palestine are highly
hypocritical and instrumental for the purposes of propaganda, in fact, the
crowds in the Middle East countries are very
much in favour of the Palestinians and contrary to the Zionists. Now, by
systematically having attitudes exonerating the crimes and the Israeli
occupation – when not clearly being supporters thereof – the U.S. and its
subordinates destroy, a priori, the development of sympathies on the "Arab
streets". Although Turkey is not an Arab country, its government
had to support the indignation of its people upon Israel 's
terrorist action on the Mavi Marmara,
with damage to the commercial and political relations between Turkey and the
Israeli entity. In turn, the regime
change in Egypt
had immediate consequences favourable to the Palestinians, whom the Egyptians
declared their support to. In a face-saving exercise and with an assistance logic,
the EU makes donations to the Palestinians, in particular to the corrupts in Ramallah;
In Iraqi, the Western energy multinationals are back to the wells that
give access to 8.3% of world oil reserves, as everybody would have guessed
before the American and British invasion. Exactly the same happened in Libya by
using a grim sharing criterion - France took possession of one third of the Libyan
oil since it had one third share on the bombings carried through[7];
In Iraqi, from the very beginning of the conquest, the
U.S. imposed the transposition into law of such interesting aspects as legal
immunity to foreign contractors and to private military and security firms as
the notorious Blackwater; the absence of taxes on profits from exported goods;
or the obligation to purchase registered seed (GMO) from the major companies
Monsanto or Cargill[8];
A semi-independent Iraqi Kurdistan was established that was tolerant
towards its Kurdish brothers in Turkey, which sometimes causes heartburn to
Erdogan; and in Iraqi it is feared that, if there is a radical power change in
Syria, the province of al-Anbar in Syria's border and with a large Sunni majority
will be tempted to secession because of being displeased with the Shiite power
in Bagdad. The borders resulting from the colonial sharing era are almost all
full of artificiality and nonsense;
Perhaps the part that appeals less to the U.S.
and its affiliates is the fact that the anti-Iranian antagonism developed by Saddam
and ordered by the U.S. gave
rise to a strong link between the Iraqis – people and government, mostly Shiite
- and Iran .
Even during the American occupation, the UN sanctions against Iran , from 2006
onwards, were totally ignored by the Iraqis, thus contributing to the
harmlessness of such sanctions. The bloody Iraqi episode – we are looking
forward to the next chapters – reminds us that the military always shout
"mission accomplished" even when they withdraw strategically
defeated.
4 - Iran , the Westerners'
juicy target
4.1 - Recent history of Western intervention in Iran
a)
Iran ’s Prime Minister Mossadegh, in the 50s of the last century, humiliated England - which
exercised suzerainty over
the country since 1913 – when he nationalized the oil sector
controlled by BP's forerunner;
b)
In 1953, CIA and MI6 overthrew Mossadegh, supporting
the Shah in a despotic regime. The Iranians only freed themselves from the Pahlevi
dynasty in 1979, after a democratic revolution which was later superseded by
the enforcement of the Sharia law imposed by the Shiite clergy around Khomeini,
considered by the people as a consequent opponent of the Shah. But in real life
there are many tolerance situations towards the rigours of the Islamic law;
c)
Still in 1979, within the scope of that
democratic revolution, the people's anti-americanism took to the streets and
the students occupied the U.S. Embassy, thereby sequestering dozens of officials
for a possible exchange with the Shah who had taken refuge in the U.S. Dissatisfied, the U.S. tried a military rescue operation
but failed disastrously, leaving behind aircraft wrecks in the Iranian desert. Meanwhile, the Iranian property in the U.S. was frozen,
to be released two years later when the Embassy's officials were handed over.
d)
With the overthrow of the Shah, in 1979, CENTO,
a military organization dominated by the U.S. and the UK, was dissolved; in it,
beyond Iran, were participating Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey as links of the siege
of the USSR;
e)
In 1980, Saddam Hussein's Iraq wished to
reverse the democratic evolution in Iran by taking advantage of the divisions
between Khomeini's supporters and the Iranian left in order to prevent
contagion of the Iraqi Shiites and also to obtain territorial advantages in oil
areas;
f)
Thus, began the Iran-Iraq war with very unequal
international support; the U.S.
and Saudi Arabia were
financing Saddam, who also had some support from Egypt
and USSR ; the latter, being
a seller of weapons to Saddam, changed sides when the U.S. became dominant in the support for Iraq . The
supporters of Iran were only
Syria and Libya .
g)
Amongst the military forces on the ground
there was a great inequality as far as men and equipment were concerned. Iraq had a superior military power, although Iran was far
more densely populated. However, Saddam has disregarded the political and
cultural uniformity of Iran ,
one of the oldest states on earth which, for example, refused the use of Arabic
and got back to Farsi shortly after Islamization – unlike Syria , Mesopotamia and North
Africa . And this notwithstanding the linguistic and ethnic
diversity;
h)
Such inequality of forces caused a much
greater number of Iranian casualties - 500,000/1 million dead - against 300,000
Iraqis who even used chemical weapons and bombed Bushehr nuclear power plant.
This time, the use of chemical weapons by Saddam was not condemned because the
dictator was on the American side of the war;
i)
Iran 's foreign policy after the war with Iraq
has been curbing the animosity of the U.S.
and breaking the international siege and isolation proposed by the U.S. . Seen in
these terms, Iran does not
acknowledge the existence of Israel
and has built political bridges with Syria , the Lebanese Hezbollah and
the Palestinian Hamas;
j)
Concerning the U.S. military interventions
in Iraq and Afghanistan – respectively along its western and eastern borders -
Iran has been very cautious, without harming its historical links with the
Shiite majority in Iraq (60% of the
total) or with Afghanistan, where there are linguistic or religious affinities
with Hasaras, Tajiks, Aimaks and Pashtuns;
4.2 – The Iranian external relations matrix
Globalisation, for which the multinationals and the financial system
have fought so hard, caused a perverse effect in the usual Western power. Instead
of seeing all states and peoples of the world lining up in a submissive
vassal's attitude towards the United States - as thought or desired after the
collapse of the USSR - there was a clear weakening of the economies and of the
capacity for political action of Western powers, by contrast with a new power –
China – which is increasingly developing and strengthening its influence in the
world scene; along with China, there is
a reaffirmation of Russia and the rise of regional powers such as Brazil and
India and, on another level, South Africa, Turkey and Iran.
In this context, given the Western economic decline, the main powers in
the East - Near East and Middle East - have
sought a political and economic realignment, by looking eastward and southward
and by increasing the relations between themselves as well.
a)
Two of these powers – Turkey and Iran – have been cementing strong
cooperation links. Turkey ,
after the collapse of the USSR
felt less threatened, established bridges with Turkish-speaking nations of Central Asia and, without dismissing NATO and the
American military bases, has assumed great independence on the
international scene. On the other hand, Turkey understood that entering the
EU is but an elusive dream about which its population is less and less
enthusiastic;
b)
The foreign policy of the AKP of Erdogan is
to stand like a bridge between East and West and, as far as Iran is concerned,
large-scale investments were made by them there, thus playing recently an
active role together with Brazil in intermediating the American pressure on
Iran in connection with the latter's nuclear programme (see 4.3 in this
document). Within this "bridge" scope between two worlds, Turkey
receives gas from Iran through two pipelines coming from Tabriz, as well as, since
2005, being crossed by the BTC (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan), the oil pipeline controlled
by BP with the high support of the U.S. in order to prevent oil transit routes
through Russia or Iran. In parallel, BTC transports gas from Turkmenistan to Erzurum
in Turkey ,
to be incorporated in the Nabucco project , the viability of which is highly at
risk;
c)
To the East and North of Iran are those
countries linked to the SCO – the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation formed in
2001 with the Shanghai Five members (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) created in 1996, which was joined by Uzbekistan. Later on, Iran , India ,
Mongolia (2006) and Pakistan joined
as observers. These countries surround almost entirely an American
"enclave" called Afghanistan ;
d)
The existence of SCO – in spite of the
rivalries and animosities between some of its members or observers –does not
suit the U.S.
To unite the huge populations of China
and India , with China 's financial power, the energy reserves of Russia , Iran
and Kazakhstan and also Russia 's
and China 's
military power - in addition to the fact that four of
the ten partners have nuclear weapons - is a structuring element in world
geopolitics. Recently, the two major
permanent members of SCO vetoed the Western purposes for Syria and do not demonstrate any interest in
serious participation in any sanctions against Iran ;
e)
India receives some 15% of its energy requirements from Iran which is
its nearest energy source. One supply route is from Chabahar, a Southeast
Iranian harbour, outside the Persian Gulf, where India is investing in its
development by possibly building an undersea oil pipeline in order to avoid
passing on Pakistani soil. Another strategic development would be the
construction of a multimodal corridor which would connect Bombay [Mumbai] to St
Petersburg, with branches to Europe and Central Asia, passing through the whole
Iranian territory and Turkmenistan, which would thus send its gas to India through
an exchange system with Iranian gas. This Project does not please the Westerners
who would always stay out of it[9];
f)
In March of 2010, Iran and Pakistan signed
an agreement for building an oil pipeline connecting both countries, the
infra-structure of which has been completed in Iranian soil, on July 2011,
after overcoming the several years of U.S. pressure, which preferred to
transport electricity from Tajikistan through Afghanistan. The project aims at establishing branches within
Pakistan and a passage to India with subsequent branches that may subsequently
reach Bangladesh[10];
g)
In January 2010, the transfer of gas from
the Dauletabad field in Southern Turkmenistan and Khangiran in the Northeast of Iran[11] was
started, where it integrates the internal network of Iran, thus opening a new outlet
for the huge Turcoman reserves, after the opening of another connection on the
west, in 1977, next to the border between the two countries, in the Caspian Sea[12];
h)
Apart from oil and gas, Iran is in the world
top ten places regarding to the production of zinc, lead, cobalt, aluminium,
manganese and copper[13].
4.3 - Iran's nuclear programme
Iran's nuclear programme started in the 1950s with the assistance of the
U.S. and it was discontinued after the 1979 revolution. At that time, the
German company Kraftwerk Union AG, linked to Siemens and AEG Telefunken,
withdrew from the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant due to the
U.S. pressure.
In 1995, after recovering from the damage resulting from the war with
Iraq, Iran resumed its nuclear programme namely to conclude the Bushehr nuclear
power plant, within the Framework of an agreement with Russia, meanwhile
stating that such nuclear power plant programme will be developed in Arak and
Darkhovin/Ahvaz as well to produce 6000 Mw electricity up to 2010. For that
purpose, it has or plans to have research nuclear reactors in Tabriz, Ramsar and
Tehran, other facilities in Natanz and Isfahan and to explore uranium mines in
the Southeast (Saghand and Jasd).
Since the resumption of the nuclear programme, the U.S., backed by its
European allies and the Israeli subsidiary, has been making never substantiated
accusations that there is a concealed project for the production of nuclear
weapons. Revealing that the dog always barks first and louder than its master, Israel
has been showing its appetite for the bombing of Iran's nuclear power plants,
as it has done on Osirak, in Iraq, in 1981. However, its master has a firm hand and is
hindering the action, as it prevented Israel's retaliation when Saddam fired
Scud missiles on Israel, in 1991; nevertheless, this action remains latent.
The sanctions adopted by the UN started in 2006, in the framework of the
customary use of the Institution to cover the interests of the U.S. and the
rest of the Western people. In March
2010, Noam Chomsky clearly expresses that "Iran is perceived as a threat
because it never obeyed the orders of the United States. Militarily, such
threat is irrelevant”.
The U.S. tension has deteriorated the procurement process of nuclear
fuel by Iran, what does not happen with any other country having nuclear power
plants. In 2009, Iran requested the assistance from IAEA (International Atomic
Energy Agency) for obtaining fuel for research for the purpose of medical use,
followed by a set of diplomatic incidents for the Western control of the
material procedures, of the enrichment technology and of the transformation
into fuel intended for Iran. Refusing the western requirements, Iran began
uranium enrichment at 20% in Natanz (February 2010).
U.S. and its allies then proposed more sanctions against Iran and in
order to ease the tension of the situation, Brazil and Turkey drew up an
agreement with Iran (May 2010) on the exchange of uranium at 3.5% with another,
enriched at 20%, reaffirming “the right for all countries to research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination"[14]. This
agreement, though similar to the proposals of Western countries, did not
reverse the U.S. decision of approving new sanctions against Iran within the
framework of the UN.
However, uranium enriched up to 20% has no
application in the production of atomic weapons, as in these weapons is used
uranium at 80% (or even 90%, as is the
case of the bomb dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima). Although Ahmadinejad has
announced both Iran's capacity and disinterest in the enrichment of uranium up
to 80%, this should be regarded as being with political aims and even IAEA
considers that Iran can only enrich uranium up to 20%.
Meanwhile (April 2010), Obama stated the new U.S. nuclear doctrine
according to which the U.S. would not consider the use of nuclear weapons
against countries that do not have them and have signed the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)[15],
excluding North Korea and Iran from such guarantee. Such guarantee will of
course not count for much considering the precedent in view of Japan in 1945 or
the use of depleted uranium ammunitions in Iraq in 1991 or in Serbia in 1999.
But it is a political fact to take into consideration, a clear demonstration of
hostility.
Being Iran a signatory of the NPT and having no nuclear weapons, until
there is evidence to the contrary, the threat is obvious. Once more, the U.S.
claim for themselves more rights than the other States, calling themselves
guardians and interpreters of who has or has not the right to possess such
weapons and assuming the perpetuity of its nuclear arsenal as well as of those
of the other members of the nuclear club.
Yet, it is known that peace and security in the world would have
everything to gain from the dismantling of all weapons of mass destruction, in
particular nuclear weapons[16].
On the other hand and at the same time, an IAEA consultant stated that
the amount of uranium stored by Iran has been stable for a long time and that “the
possibility of Iran to continue to produce a nuclear weapon with a hidden
uranium stock is utterly false”. The same consultant also stated: “I believe
the problem is not the nuclear issue. Several
geopolitical interests are also at stake, since Iran plays a balance role in
the Middle East. It is a counterweight to countries as Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates, local allies of the United States. Iran has also
relations with Palestinian groups which destabilize Israel. I believe it is a
political rather than a technical problem.”[17]
There is an overwhelming hypocrisy! India and Pakistan have admittedly
nuclear weapons and they have not signed the NPT, just as the Israeli entity
which does not assume the possession of nuclear weapons and whose nuclear
weapons programme started in 1967 with the collaboration of France[18].
Following the NPT review in 2010, a conference for the denuclearization
of Middle East was planned, for which all States in the region were invited,
including the Israeli entity, not a signatory to the Treaty, although it holds
a number about 200 nuclear weapons and has the capability of delivering them in
its Jericho missiles to targets at flight distance of 11500 km.
This Israel's capability of dropping a nuclear bomb, for example on Rio
de Janeiro, far away from the region where threats to its security might arise,
is not the product of a delirium of its military. This capability attests that
Israel is a Western fortress in the Middle East and that it is part of the Western
strategic military mechanism, the head of which is Pentagon; it is therefore
justified all financial, economic and diplomatic Western support to the Israeli
entity. To this integration at the
military level should be added another well-known between CIA and Mossad.
To finish the set of U.S. accusations against Iran, a former American
officer, a senior political scientist of the "commendable" RAND
Corporation, Seth Jones, wrote an article in the American "Foreign
Affairs" Magazine in which he reveals the presence of thousands of
al-Qaida members in Iran, who have taken refuge in there when the U.S. invaded
Afghanistan. It is not hard to admit that al-Qaida's militants have joined the
crowd of Afghan refugees in Iran (one million in 2003) to save their own skin. Especially
curious is that this fact becomes known only now, ten years after the event, at
a phase in which Western propaganda is particularly fierce in diabolizing Iran.
It appears that, even after Bin Laden's death, al-Qaida continues to be a
useful political argument to Pentagon[19].
It is therefore misleading to continue with the tale of Iran's military
nuclear programme. It is worse than misleading; it is to accept a discussion
under the terms deemed convenient by the U.S. and its Israeli subsidiary which
solely aim at isolating Iran and maintaining the American and the Western
supremacy in the Middle East as well as the control of its energy sources. This
means to the Westerners, especially to the U.S., not only the control of their
own energy supply (see 4.4 in this document) but, most of all, to have the
power to interfere in the supply of strategic rivals, such as China, India,
Japan or South Korea, all of them very dependent on the energy supply from
Persian Gulf, thus having the power to determine the development of their
economies.
A new large-scale war is probably not on the agenda of the U.S.. This
year (2012), the U.S. will start integration between the Afghan army and the
Western troops in order not only to give the former more experience in the
fight against the Taliban but also to substantially reduce the direct combat of
Western troops with the opponents of their presence. It is a repetition of the
vietnamization process of the war, the results of which are known and which
were also considered a defeat of the U.S. and its allies; it is also a repeat
of the process initiated in Iraq some years ago.
These processes are above all soft forms of leaving the ground without
achieving a strategic victory by eliminating the threat of the enemy and giving
the idea that the military intervention and the "aid" allowed the
"locals" to develop their own and autonomous capabilities of success
in the future and of virtuous progress towards democracy and civilization. Given
that military interventions are very specifically intended to serve the
interests of the invader and occupier, the social and political changes are not
those necessary or those accepted by the people and hence the fight takes hold
again and steps up after the military
withdrawal of the invaders.
This transfer process of military responsibilities to local soldiers has
also several advantages; it is welcome by the American public opinion which
sees its soldiers coming back home, since as far as mercenaries are concerned,
no one really cares whether they continue on the ground and act without any
public scrutiny; it relieves the
coffers of the American state that faces unemployment, poverty and the crucial
support to the financial system; it constitutes a disguised form of defeat
assumption.
It seems to be underway a military strategy of no invasion of enemy
territory with the occupation of its land,
the management of administrative disorder, refugees, attacks and the
responsibility for the reconstruction of infrastructure … even if that might
benefit American companies placed in the first line of the award of contracts.
It should be recalled that in the new NATO Strategic Concept (2010) are
defined four stages of "crisis management" - preventive
protection, proactive crisis management, use of military force and post
intervention stabilization – the latter
being known as the most expensive, the most time consuming and the most
difficult, involving more human and financial costs for the invaders.
In order to avoid this latter stage in Libya, the military intervention
was based on bombing, on the use of information collection and on logistical
support to anti-Gaddafi armed groups.
Once Gaddafi was defeated and the rights over oil resources were
reassigned in favour of the Westerners, no one seems to be concerned about the
arrangements between the various armed groups that fight each other or, even
less so, about the reconstruction of the war-torn areas, primarily
after-effects of the Western intervention.
Also in Bahrain, in face of the popular demonstrations, Saudi and UAE
troops intervened to maintain the power of the al-Khalifa family, despite the
fact that are located in Bahrain, the headquarters of the command of the U.S.
5th fleet and the number of military present there is around 5000, plus the
garrisons of some 30 ships.
This assumption of strategic weakness becomes clearer faced with the
dimension of Iran and the geopolitical aspects of its vicinity. Therefore,
economic measures, murder and sabotage will be preferred by relying on the
unconditional support of the grim Mossad in the region; or even provocative
measures with drones or others, with intervention of special groups eventually
created in vassal countries of the Gulf region. In this regard, Saudi Arabia
would be the best placed, since its military expenditure corresponded to 11,2% of
GDP in 2010 against 2,5% for Iran in 2007.
In addition to its Israeli fortress, the U.S. in 2012, unlike what
happened in 1979, has no Saddam to confront Iran and are forced to be at the
forefront of the confrontation, in an unpromising but dangerous bluff game; Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates can function as aids but not to enter, by proxy, into direct
confrontation with Iran. But, just like Israel, they would be delighted if the U.S.
would crush over Iran and would militarily occupy the region (even more), since
this would guarantee the perpetuity of the various royal houses of the Gulf as protectorates
of the American, as they have been of the British until decolonization.
However, any military conflict in the Gulf would impact for an
indefinite period the whole world energy distribution system and the energy
prices (increased by 30%, according to IMF)[20]
which, in the disastrous state of Western economies, would only reinforce their
steep decline. The White House and the Pentagon are well aware of that.
4.4 - The impact of energy sanctions imposed by the EU
In 2010, the proven reserve/production ratios for oil and natural gas,
referred to or calculated on the basis of information published in the Statistical
Review of World Energy related to 2010, show the huge reserves existing on the
shores of the Persian Gulf and, in contrast, China and the U.S. strategic
shortages that forces them to ensure abroad their energy supplies.
Iran, with the third largest reserves in absolute values of oil – after
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela - and the second largest ones – after Russia - for
natural gas, is the most important country in energy terms, particularly because
it holds in its territory huge amounts of the two most versatile fossil fuels. It
should be noted that the European gas producers have relatively limited
reserves, measured through the above mentioned ratio – Norway with 18.8 years, the
Netherlands 17 and England 5.3 years.
(production years – 2010 level)
Oil
|
Natural gas
|
||
World
|
46.2
|
World
|
58.6
|
Saudi Arabia
|
72.4
|
Saudi
Arabia
|
13.6
|
China
|
10.0
|
Algeria
|
56,0
|
U.S.
|
11,3
|
China
|
28,9
|
Iran
|
88.4
|
Un. Arab Emir.
|
117,6
|
Iraq
|
128.1
|
U.S.
|
12,6
|
Kuwait
|
110.9
|
Iran
|
213,8
|
Mexico
|
10,6
|
Qatar
|
217.0
|
Russia
|
20,6
|
Russia
|
76.0
|
Venezuela
|
234,1
|
Turkmenistan
|
189,4
|
Just like China has been diligently developing an ambitious plan for the
construction of hydroelectric dams and nuclear power plants, while
simultaneously, investing in renewable energy (therefore its interest in EDP-
Eletricidade de Portugal), Iran will seek to ensure a longer duration of its
reserves and energy exports by creating a nuclear alternative desired since the
time of the last of the Palehvi.
In 2010, as compared to 1995 and according to elements published by
UNCTAD, we highlight the following elements on Iran's foreign trade which
reveal the enormous relevance of energy products in exports;
Variation in
total exports
|
5,5
times
|
Variation in
oil exports, crude or refined oil
|
5.7
times
|
Variation
in gas exports, natural or non-natural
|
14.3 times
|
Variation
in the remaining export
|
4.4
times
|
The spatial distribution of Iranian exports in general and of energy
products shows the structural changes in world trade and production that are
materialised in the decline of Western domination after some three centuries of
dominance. These global changes lead to tensions, conflicts and strategic
adjustments which hierarchically restructure the States.
Balance in energy transactions is normally unstable and there are many
factors affecting prices. When the EU bureaucrats decided to cancel oil imports
from Iran, from July onwards, to show the U.S. strategic suzerainty what they
could do, they should certainly know that no insurmountable difficulties would
emerge for Iran there from. Within the proverbial wisdom of the bureaucrats, it
is expected that Iran's retaliation to suspend oil exports to France and
England, announced on February 19, will not represent another element of
sacrifice for the peoples of Europe.
Most likely there will be a logistics reallocation of the origins and
destinations with or without reduction of Iran's overall export level. Among
Iran's main customers, China and India, for example, will not be very keen to
keep pace with the EU by refusing Iranian oil, especially because the economic
dynamism they are experimenting makes them eager for oil and unwilling to
cooperate with elements of instability in energy supply; on the other hand,
Japan and South Korea only too reluctantly and in the face of Western strong
pressure will play the boycott game.
In the past fifteen years there has been a constant drop in the weight
of all countries in "developed" Europe relatively to the total
exports of crude oil or refined products:
42.8% in 1995 and only 22.5% in 2010. The loss of position of the
European countries and, to a lesser extent, of Japan and South Korea is clearly
offset by the increasing significance of Chinese and Indian imports; these,
taken together, were irrelevant in the context of Iran's exports in 1995 but
they show China's growing weight since then and India's as from 2006. As of 2007, Iranian exports to China and India,
as a whole, clearly exceed those to Europe.
Primary source: UNCTAD
Iranian gas export represented, in 2010, only 2.3% of total exports
against 79.3% of oil and refined products in the same year. In this context, the
relative importance of "developed" Europe represents only 7.8% of the
total, although it had greater representativeness in recent years.
Primary source: UNCTAD
Next, let us evaluate the structure of imports by Europe and by the U.S.
to assess the dependence on Middle East suppliers based on data collected from
the Statistical Review of World Energy relating to 2010.
The overall crude or refined oil import by Europe and the U.S. has a quantitative
value of nearly 12094 thousand barrel per day in the first case and 11689 thousand
barrels per day by the U.S., for the 2010 reference year. The share of supplies
from the Middle East is greater in Europe than in the U.S. and therefore
sanctions may lead to increased dependence on Russia in the first case. Marked
differences should also be noted regarding the geographical position but
essentially with respect to the degree of concentration in the four main
supplying areas of Europe on one hand and of the U.S. on the other hand.
(%)
Europe
|
U.S.
|
||
Former USSR
|
49,5
|
Canada
|
21,7
|
Middle East
|
19,5
|
S & Cent.
America
|
18,9
|
North Africa
|
13,9
|
Middle East
|
14,8
|
West Africa
|
7,6
|
West Africa
|
14,4
|
Others
|
9,6
|
Others
|
30,2
|
It is doubtful whether the U.S. want to get involved in a new war of
great territorial and temporal extension and its European allies, even less, since
the Empire wars are not popular in Europe. Moreover, in the intervention in
Libya, the European actors have shown that they had not a suitable facility and
they could not even maintain an adequate supply of ammunition to the war front[21].
When speaking about war, upon landing on the Troika's Iberian colony, it
is unavoidable to remember that all submarines have doors, the case of Minister
Portas being the only one that reminds you of submarines.
Portas, with his excited preacher manners looks like a Torquemada exhorting
to the burning of the Iranian infidels or the protagonist of a popular festival
of lies, benefiting from the ignorance or subservience of the Portuguese
journalism in geopolitical matters. We, in Portugal, all also remember the
manifestation of his catholic fundamentalism against the so-called "love
boat" transporting activists in defence of abortion, in 2005, casting him
into ridicule as he sent two gunboats against it… because the famous submarines ordered to
German shipyards, had not entered in operation.
- - - - -- - - - -- ----------
The present text and others in:
* Portas is the surname of the Portuguese minister of
the Foreign Affairs
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário