terça-feira, 9 de outubro de 2018

Center and peripheries in Europe - The dynamics of inequalities since 1990



Center and peripheries in Europe - The dynamics of inequalities since 1990[1]

Globalization is as old as humanity and its acceleration by capitalism has generated immense inequalities. No social or political struggle to combat inequality has any seriousness or validity if it does not have as its ultimate objective the end of capitalism.

1 - Summary of capitalism’s recent evolution
2 - Possible alternatives for peripheral states
3 - The formation of inequalities in Europe - 1
4 - The formation of inequalities in Europe - 2
5 - Notes for a solution

1 - Summary of capitalism’s recent evolution

The dynamics of inequalities are a consequence of a very complex process of interaction between economic, social, demographic, cultural and geopolitical variables. Focusing this process on any particular aspect such as external or budget deficits, unemployment or job creation, on tools such as currency, it is a tricky way to defend the continuity of capitalism’s invasive, destructive and genocidal drive.

We recently observed purchasing power differences in Portugal and its evolution in the period 2004/13, and how the policy of collective impoverishment to satisfy the gluttony of the financial system was reflected in the different parts of the country. We will now look at inequalities in Europe and its dynamics through population changes, as a means of gauging whether what happened in Portugal was an isolated episode or is part of the constant formation of centers and peripheries inherent to capitalistic economic and social structure.

A territory’s population variations reveal the attraction or repulsion that territory exerts on humans. This can occur because of more or less basic socio economic reasons or due to extreme causes such as war or calamities, some more natural than others.

In the most flattering situations, those territories retain and allow greater longevity to their population, their regular reproduction and, furthermore, arrivals of people from other places where living conditions are comparatively less attractive. When life becomes difficult and opportunities become worse than elsewhere, the birth rate falls, in step with rising emigration, and that opportunities deficit may promotes population stagnation or fall. These forms of mobility have happened throughout history, having had individuals, families, or large masses of people as protagonists, with peaceful, or violent, or invasive, or conquering ways, and also as a result of environmental changes. Basically, it is through this miscegenation that humanity developed, born of the cross breading of Neanderthalensis and Homo sapiens.

We highlight some essential aspects in order to mark the path that we have been treading:

·           Roughly between the end of World War I and the end of the Second World War, the Western world lived through periods of depression, especially the Great Depression in the US, with the generation of large pockets of unemployment and poverty, in addition to the immense destruction of human lives and infrastructure, caused by those conflicts;

·           Between World War II and the oil shock in 1973 a period of economic growth – it is the pinnacle of Keynesianism – was established with great involvement of states in creating infrastructure and social welfare institutions, under the so called European social model that, however, is not uniform since it has variants within Europe (Scandinavian and Rhine) and outside of it (Japanese) and in which trade unions played a significant role. To the above one must add, in that period, the creation of the first multilateral institutions that have started and shaped what came to be called globalization – the Bretton Woods agreements, the dollar as the dominant currency, the IMF/World Bank, the GATT (now WTO), the EEC as a lever for European integration, NATO and its variants outside the Atlantic scenario;

·           The depletion of this model came when the impact of the recovery from the destruction of the war became irrelevant and with the end of cheap energy, the emergence of environmental issues, inflation, postcolonial war in Indochina, and an increased affirmation of the so-called Third World. A new capitalist paradigm – neoliberalism – has   since been affirmed, one whose initial deployment will remain linked to the "humanitarian"  Pinochet / CIA / Milton Friedman coalition in Chile and to Thatcher’s and Reagan’s anti-social policies;

·           The economic growth limitations reduced the expectations about the continuity of technological innovation and multinational’s investment in them leading to an increased dependency, in that area, of those created under the military umbrella, such as the internet and information technologies in general, whose role clearly marks the most recent decades. The East-West competition increased with the development of the arm’s race, as destructive as dangerous, which came to contribute to the collapse of the so called Eastern bloc and its state capitalism, with the rapid recycling of its politicians into inflamed heralds of neoliberalism;

·           In the sequel, the financial markets merged into a single network based on the deepening of information technologies, raising the indebtedness and speculation levels to figures without any connection with reality, creating the bases for the unsustainability of the financial environment that can be seen today. In turn, the multinationals operating space has expanded, with branches sprouting all over as mushrooms during wet weather and, for better exploitation of the low wages and degrading working conditions imposed by regimes more or less dictatorial, invented the relocation, corresponding to the segmentation of goods’ production by various locations or countries, generating  a logistics and transportation network, extremely dense and heavy in terms of the capital involved as well as its environmental damages;

·           This segmentation of the production inherent to the relocation contributed to the dismantling of what was left of the "social state" in Western Europe, in the USA, or in those countries born out of state capitalism in Eastern Europe. And, by disconnecting locally or nationally the various stages of the production processes, the efficacy of strikes and the workers' claiming power were lost, since unions did not follow, in the least, capitalist centralization, and kept labor struggles with geographically limited scope of action. Politically, a unique, economistic thinking was generated, based on the Washington consensus which divided party systems into more reactionary and less reactionary groups, pushing leftist ideas into a media marginality;

·           The freedom of movement of goods and capital inherent in relocations has destroyed the structure of cross sector national matrices, accentuated the regional and local inequalities within each country, as well as deepened the usual ditches among peripheral countries and so-called winning countries or regions in the context of globalization, around which the former gravitate. These disruptions and restructuring have led to massive destruction of capital, abandonment of fields, houses and productive infrastructures, as well as large migrations, simultaneously restricted and desired by the powers, with security mechanisms cynically parallel to the license for the commodification of human beings, aiming at the availability of a cheap and submissive labor force, in the exact measure of their precarious life;

·           Thus, today, along with the consolidation in the West of structural unemployment articulated with labor precariousness, there is a resort to immigrants, with or without papers, both in central and peripheral countries – also coexisting, in these, with the emigration of their most qualified naturals. All of them, however, embedded into the logic of capital, seeking lower costs for the labor resource in order to increase competitiveness, attract investment and ... generate employment, a discourse that is common within the political classes and the media. Never do they mention, in those situations where there is, in fact, new jobs, they are characterized by a salary and contractual or working conditions more degrading than the previous ones.

·           This mobility is based on the variety and ease of traveling of human beings, which increased the possibility of geography change for many millions of people, despite the difficulties to those movements placed by the States, though guards, controls, and border walls and nets. The political classes and their police forces can only seek to track, decipher and place obstacles to mobility but can never nullify the huge creativity of the poor, generated by their great drive to live. Still on this topic, one needs to add, because of the inhumanity and dram it evidences, the case of the millions of displaced persons and refugees from the Middle East, left to their own devices or exploited as cheap labor in "host" countries that, “coincidentally”, have very high responsibilities in the wars and the atrocities, which is common knowledge.

2 - Possible alternatives for peripheral states

Capitalism has always generated inequalities, be them between people or groups of people, or between regions or countries; inequality lies in its genetic code because current capitalist accumulation is based on the inequality of income and the usufruct of civilization, on sweeping to the gutter those who do not count in this accumulation of capital. No social or political fight is serious or valid if it does not have as its ultimate goal the end of capitalism.

The EU, as a pioneering place of the historically recent globalization, has since its inception aimed at freedom of movement of capital, goods and people, so that the market be extended – read:  to provide capitalist accumulation – with minimal restrictions of "context", legislative, administrative, social, cultural, while reducing national idiosyncrasies. The national and local capitalists, especially those in the peripheral or with weaker economic structures nation-states, are left with the following alternatives, particularized for the Portuguese case:

·             Insertion into the globalized market, through the venerated competitiveness, which requires productive and financial dimension, commercial, technological and management capability, fiscal benefits and public support. Let us call it, applying it to Portugal, the logic of the Portuguese Tiger, which deployment is lacking “only” a dynamic capitalist class  with investing capacity and available budget to support it;

·             Business capture through privileged links with the state and the local political class (where corruption is key), which can be hampered by the massive invasive drives of global capital, as hinted by those present in the dark TTIP and CETA cases. It is the desire for nationalist strength, in a post-Salazarist logic implicitly defended by the Keynesian augurs, defenders of a state owned currency and domestic quantitative easings, tempered by the convenient repression of those rebelling against inflation;

·             The subordinate insertion (or the pure and simple integration of the technical and worker force assets) into the business networks of the large companies headquartered at the Center or multinationals – this is the logic followed by the Passos government and followed with some restraint by Costa, with the added difficulty of Portugal not being of special interest to multinationals, either as a producer or as a consumer; that is, Portugal tends to be seen, mainly, as a complement to the Spanish market;

·             Anemia or disappearance, due to the small dimension, because adequate capitalization is not possible, technology or management capacity is lacking, and debt, as a consented instrument of dominance, is asphyxiating. This is the remaining scenario, signifying a role as a satellite of the Spanish state (if it persists) which is already visible in the ECB's search to anchor an Iberian banking system on Santander, similarly to a past situation of the escudo being indexed to the peseta and the Portuguese government having had to wait for the end of the negotiations for the integration of Spain in the then EEC, in order to make a joint entry.

Hence the continuation of the process of reducing the role of nation-states in the European and world space , especially of small and medium-sized ones, to large municipalities, level 1 NUTs in the phraseology of Brussels, vocationally tending to exercise the puncture tax, the monopoly of violence (courts, police, legislative coercion and rules) to ensure the presence of sad Rambos in the Nato wars, to buy military junk from suzerain powers’ industry, to maintain the financial system fattening debt service or a social assistance that sustains meekness in the plebs and, finally, to guarantee the flag’s presence at international meetings, or the national anthem at the soccer national team’s matches, for the pride of the patriots.

3 - The formation of inequalities in Europe - 1

These various ongoing processes, inherent to the dominant production mode, originate a very complex matrix of population movements and changes in the classification of regions as people attracting or repelling. As is known, people will not move to other than the usual places if they do not have a marked level of discomfort and disenchantment; and the distance or risks they are willing to take are directly proportional to their unhappiness. From a demographic point of view these dynamics are continuously restructuring the space, setting up centers and peripheries, confluence areas for people and activities and zones of exclusion and abandonment.

The evolution of the population in the various regions of the present EU space during a relatively broad period of time (in this case around 25 years) thus gives clear indications about the formation of these central or peripheral territories. This is in spite of the transfer of public financial resources, made in the name of territorial cohesion and the approximation of living conditions among all those who live in the EU; but, in reality, aiming primarily at the flow of goods and services, better access to raw materials, the centralization of capital, and labor exploitation; in short, all the motivations inherent in the capitalist production mode.

We considered the size of the European population, as much as possible, in five moments, separated by five-year lapses, starting in 1990 and ending in 2015; and computed the five-year variations at the country level and its regional districts at the second (NUTS-2) or third level (NUT-3), whenever the available data would allow us.

For the 28 EU countries, we have observed those with decreases in population in each of the five-year periods and measured the representativeness of the sum of their populations in the Community total:

Countries with decreasing population

1995/1990
2000/1995
2005/2000
2010/2005
2015/2010
No.
9
10
10
9
12
Population (1000)
66049
103189
104190
168365
234261
% of total EU
13.7
21.2
21.1
33.5
46.2
All periods - Bulgaria, Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary and Romania
In 4 periods - Poland, except 1995/90
In three periods - Czech Republic (the top three);
In two periods - Slovenia (the top two) and Germany (the latter two)
In a single period - Slovakia (2005/2000); Greece, Spain and Portugal (in the latter)
                                                                                    Primary source: Eurostat

These elements reveal:

·           Some constancy in the number of countries with a decreasing population but which has been expanding in the last five years, as an evident effect of the financial crisis , for countries in the South;

·           There is a consolidate core of countries with continued population regression – those forming EU’s East periphery – showing  the failure of its integration in the EU after the crash in 1991 of state capitalism countries. In fact, what was intended with this integration, that had Germany as its main protagonist, was the access to natural resources and to educated and cheap labor.

·           The cases with some success in the demographic evolution, in the last periods, are the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia.

·           We highlight the case of Germany, which reveals a population regression in the last ten years, and Merkel's desire to accommodate many thousands of refugees, whose desperation facilitates the imposition of low wages and restrictions to working conditions and citizenship.

In this context, the populations in regression increased from 13.7% in 1995 to around 21% in 2000 and 2005 due to the inclusion of Poland; to 33.5% in 2010 with the entry of Germany into the group; and to 46.2% in 2015 with the reinforcement constituted by the countries victims of the exorcisms of the financial capital, in the south edge.

More broadly, EU countries can be allocated according to the average values (in %) for population trends in the five-year periods:

Decrease

Weak growth

Average growth

High growth
Latvia  
-5,73

Czech Republic
0.35

Italy
1.41

France
3,26
Lithuania
-4.56

Slovakia
0.50

Greece  
1.44

Spain
3.71
Bulgaria
-3.85

Germany
0.53

Finland
1.92

Malta  
4.03
Estonia   
-3.49

Slovenia
0.66

Denmark
1.96

Ireland
5.76
Romania
-3.05

Portugal
0.76

Austria
2.31

Cyprus  
8.20
Croatia
-2.40




Netherlands
2.38

Luxembourg
8.24
Hungary
-1.02




Belgium
2.51



Poland
-0.01




Great Britain
2.57









Sweden
2.72



                                                                                                   Primary source: Eurostat

In addition to those countries with the already mentioned populational regression situations, there are others with almost no growth in population during the period, among which are Germany, three peripheries of the Germanic world and Portugal, that stands out clearly against the other EU’s southern periphery countries.

Among the countries having higher average population growth, we intend to highlight the similarities and differences between those involved in banking or deficit "adjustment programs". All of them show sharp declines in population growth rates over the last five years, with the exception of Italy where there has been a steady positive trend over the last 25 years; and among those, Greece, Portugal and Spain have population regression in 2010/15. On the other hand, the demographic growth in Cyprus and Ireland in all the years before the crisis and in Spain in the first decade of the century is remarkable.

In general – with the notable exception of Germany – the majority of cases of higher population growth happen in the EU’s richest countries, particularly Luxembourg, in those where the of recent years’ crisis (2010/2015) had little effect on the population growth pace (France, Denmark, the Netherlands and Great Britain), or did not prevent the continuation of the increases (Belgium, Italy, Austria, Finland and Sweden).

Emigration bound for those richer countries has great responsibilities in what was stated above, demonstrating that the highest density of productive structures and a higher economic dynamism — even in the global context of anemic GDP growth rates – attract people of areas where the economic and social situation is much worse. Those are the cases of war (Libya, sub-Saharan Africa, Sudan ...), an essentially economy related emigration that, more recently, blended with the multitudes of refugees victims of the total disorganization fostered by Western strategic interests in the Middle East.

Countries with declining populations do not have the euro as currency or have recently joined the euro, as is the case of the three Baltic countries. Among the nations with mediocre growth two founders of the euro zone (Germany and Portugal) are included, others having few years within the same (Slovenia since 2007 and Slovakia after 2009) and the Czech Republic which keeps its own currency. Countries with average population growth in the 25 years of observation are founders of the Eurozone in 1999 (Greece, which was integrated in the same two years later) as well as Britain and Denmark, that maintain their national currencies. Finally, the countries with the highest population increases are all members of the euro from the start or from 2008 (Malta and Cyprus).

It would be simplistic and demagogic to link demographic developments with integration or not in the euro area[2] . The recent integrated do not show changes in the demographic evolution that can be imputable to the use of the so-called common currency; and among the adherents in the period 2007/2009 there are as many cases of mediocre population growth as of clearly expansive demography. Finally, it seems more relevant to note that the euro or its absence did not specifically change the historical inequalities within Europe, while maintaining the Eastern periphery (clearly), the South periphery (more diverse in the demographic change theme) and a Center made up of the richer countries, to which Switzerland and Norway must be added, in spite of the population decline observed in the EU's main economic and financial power, Germany. This should disgust Portuguese fans of Le Pen for whom integration into the single currency introduced hell where once there was only national sovereignty and a rich and happy people.


4 - The formation of inequalities in Europe - 2

What was stated before on the establishment of central and peripheral areas within the European framework, particularly in the EU space concerns will enriched, sharpened, if we consider the territorial division in NUT-2 regions. We highlight some conclusions from the following table:
EU regions with population decline in the five-year period

1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
Belgium (11)
1
1
-
-
-
Bulgaria (6)
6
6
6
6
6
Czech Republic (8)
na
6
7
1
3
Denmark (5)
-
-
-
-
1
Germany (36)
5
11
12
25
25
Select by country
1
1
1
1
1
Ireland (2)
na
na
-
-
1
Greece (4) (a)

1


2
Spain (19) (b)
5
5
2
-
11
Select a country
2
5
1
1
3
Croatia (2)
na
na
na
1
2
Italy (19) (c)
7
11
7
3
2
Cyprus (1)
-
-
-
-
-
Latvia (1)
1
1
1
1
1
Lithuania (1)
1
1
1
1
1
Luxembourg (1)
-
-
-
-
-
Hungary (7)
3
7
7
6
6
Malta (1)
-
-
-
-
-
Netherlands (12)
-
-
1
1
4
Austria (9)
-
3
1
1
1
Select by country
na
12
10
9
11
Portugal (7)
na
2
1
3
6
Romania (8)
7
7
8
7
7
United States (1)
1
1
-
-
-
United States (4)
-
-
3
2
2
Finland (5)
-
1
1
1
-
Sweden (8)
-
5
3
3
-
G Brittany (35) (d)
6
10
2
-
1
         EU Total(252)
46
97
75
73
97
                                  Notes:  the total number of regions in each country is in ()
(a)     Data referring to only 4 of the 13 Greek regions which held about 46% of the total population
(b)     In 1995 without data from Ceuta and Melilla
(c)     Until 2005 without data from Emilia-Romagna and Marche
(d)     The total number of regions with elements is: 25 (1995), 31 (2000). 33 (2005), and 35 (2010 and 2015)
                                                                                                       Primary source: Eurostat

·           The number of regions with population declines between 1995 (19.3% of the total) and 2000 (39.4%), more than doubles, the main contributions coming from countries such as Germany, Italy, Sweden, Great Britain, and the inclusion of Poland in this list only in 2000.

·           In the first decade of this century the number of regions with declining population remains constant (about 30% of the total), with emphasis in the contributions of Germany, Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria to which have been added in the last five years Greece, Portugal and Spain, as the most relevant cases;

·           This situation reveals that, on the eastern periphery, the integration of those countries that have left state capitalism regimes is very distant from the eternal bliss promised by the heralds of neoliberalism, in spite of community funds channeled or foreign investors coming from the Occident that, naturally, perpetuated low wages and corruption, destroying the cushions of social support that those peoples had previously benefited from, a destruction that has been feeding the known fascist drifts. Colonization, as a rule, integrates colonized peoples into spaces where inequalities worsen and economic and social disintegrations increase.

When one observes, as in the following table, the population share of regions with demographic regression, a more precise measure of the volume of those excluded by the dynamics of the markets and their relevance in the various national plans is obtained.


Share of the national population contained in regions with a population decrease (%)

1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
Belgium (11)
9.4
12.5
-
-
-
Bulgaria (6)
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Czech Republic (8)
na
78.2
88.8
11.8
33.8
Denmark (5)
-
-
-
-
14.5
Germany (36)
17.5
31.9
30.2
58.4
66.3
Select by country
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Ireland (2)
na
na
-
-
26.5
Greece (4) (a)
-
4.0
-
-
81.5
Spain (19) (b)
24.1
23.3
2.6
-
56.3
Select a country
3.5
12.0
2.1
2.1
7.1
Croatia (2)
na
na
na
67.1
100.0
Italy (19) (c)
26.5
56.7
26.1
4.8
1.5
Cyprus (1)
-
-
-
-
-
Latvia (1)
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Lithuania (1)
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Luxembourg (1)
-
-
-
-
-
Hungary (7)
50.7
100.0
100.0
70.5
69.7
Malta (1)
-
-
-
-
-
Netherlands (12)
-
-
7.0
6.8
15.6
Austria (9)
-
25.2
6.8
6.7
6.5
Select by country
na
63.9
58.0
50.2
56.7
Portugal (7)
na
9.9
7.4
64.4
72.9
Romania (8)
89.7
83.0
100.0
89.3
88.5
United States (1)
100.0
100.0
-
-
-
United States (4)
-
-
70.7
59.2
58.7
Finland (5)
-
25.4
24.8
24.2
-
Sweden (8)
-
45.4
18.9
18.2
-
G Brittany (35) (d)
24.3
37.6
7.3
-
0.9
Total EU
20.6
38.2
27.0
25.6
35.1
(1000)
99412
186068
133469
128979
178274
                                                                                                                 Primary source: Eurostat

·           Bulgaria, like the three ex-Soviet Baltic countries, shows that its entire territory is in demographic regression, and that its borders are real gaps through which the population goes. In 25 years, Bulgaria has lost 18% of its population and this decrease reaches 1/3 of the total in Severozapaden region, while in Estonia the loss is 16.4%, in Latvia 25.6% and in Lithuania 21%, so it can be said with heavy irony, that there is a real ... territorial homogeneity. It is appropriate to ask what kind of European integration is being made when, after a few years of implementation (Baltic countries since 2004 and Bulgaria after 2007), a significant proportion of those people are forced to emigrate and reduce their reproduction levels?

·           Conversely, Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg show a progressive increase of population, even taking into account their small territorial extension and the insular and the peripheral character of the first two countries. Cyprus substantially reduced its population growth in the last five years, compared to the previous ones, but – and despite the intervention of the troika – its population increased 3.4% in 2010/15, much above that of Portugal in any the five five-year periods since 1990.

·           Belgium and Slovenia, in this century, no longer have within their territories regions in demographic regression, contrary to what happens with Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Slovakia; or even in Greece, in the area for which there is data. Also notable are the cases of Italy, Britain and also of Sweden or Finland, where the population in areas of regression is reduced.

·           The cases of large growth of parts of the population pertaining to territories in demographic regression are found in Germany, in the aforementioned Greece, Spain,  Croatia and Portugal, where the regression is announced in this century, long before the troika intervention; it is also the situation in the Czech Republic, following the progress achieved in the period 2005/10.

·           The German case deserves particular emphasis because in contradiction to the economic power of Germany, its capabilities in technology and exports that afford it huge trade surpluses, there is a set of demographically depressed regions, home to two-thirds of the population. And that goes well beyond the problems of integration of the regions belonging to the defunct GDR. Germany is a clear case of the inequalities immanent in capitalism, even if there are transfers of public funds to fill them and despite the influx of capital accumulated in the country.

·           More generally, the EU is a space of inequalities, as are the vast majority of nation-states, of any size or global level of well-being. And all the measures coming from the Brussels bureaucracy in articulation with the national political classes, only generate any reduction of inequalities if that is convenient for the multinationals and the business of the financial system, which determine the actions of those bureaucracies .

The map of Europe below presents a clear image of those inequalities:

·           which are all around them, and which signify a huge range of territories to the East, which runs from the Gulf of Finland to the Aegean and where demographic regression is evident (no data being available for the whole of the Greek territory it is considered very plausible that it should be displayed in red);

·           a large part of Germany where, essentially, only the southern regions are excluded;
·           most of the territory of the Iberian Peninsula;

·           the most extensive region with strong or reasonable population growth develops from the Bay of Biscay to southern Germany and from there to the south up to Rome;

·           there are also other areas of equal demographic dynamism in southern Scandinavia, England, and Belgium;

·           In many countries the areas of the respective capitals - Great Britain, Portugal and Spain, all the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, Germany, Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Italy stand out as areas of relative population attraction. These realities are the other side of the coin of population decline desertification situations, phenomena of inequalities exacerbation.


5 – Notes for a solution

Any solution to the well-being of the people must include:

·   priority given to the satisfaction of peoples' needs and not to an unhealthy fixation on an abstract GDP growth, with the evident contempt for the sustainability of use of the planet’s resources;

·   satisfaction of these needs as a social objective, which excludes the logic of the private surplus and the enslavement by the work, releasing the humans to the activities more suitable to each one, mainly, in the scope of leisure, culture, sport and for the management of the affections

·   organization and democratic decision-making by the people, from the grassroots up, with the application of the principle of subsidiarity, in successive spheres of population according to the critical mass necessary to satisfaction of the needs[3];

·   abolition of the political classes while catalyzers and monopoly holders of the decision power over the collective interest, and their replacement by direct democracy processes, with responsibilities determined through (direct) democratic choice in a transient and always (at any time) revocable way;

·   elimination of the competition of everybody against everybody primacy and its replacement by solidarity, helping each other and being complementary amongst the human population;

·   elimination of nation-states as elements of segregation, imposition and discrimination, on the internal level, and exclusion regarding the outside, without any harm to the cultural differences between peoples.

To be continued

This and other texts at:

http://grazia-tanta.blogspot.com/                               

http://www.slideshare.net/durgarrai/documents


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