Africa is far from overcoming the aftermath of
colonization and the existence of predatory national oligarchies, driven by the
greed of multinationals and debt-generating mechanisms. In a context of
strong and uneven demographic growth, we can say that "Africa
will continue to be ill", adapting a sentence by René Dumont
Summary
1- The painful integration of postcolonial Africa into global capitalism
2 - Demographic profile of African geopolitical areas
2.1 - North Africa
2.2 - Africa - Anchors
2.3 - Africa - remaining countries (43)
///////////////////////////////////////::::::::\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\
1- The painful integration of postcolonial Africa into global capitalism
The African
population grew by 60 per cent in the period 1950-70, 73 per cent in the 20
years between 1970 and 1990, doubles in the 30 years ending in 2010, being
estimated that by 2050 it will more than ten times higher than the population existing a century before, that is, about 2500 M people. All this happens because
mortality has fallen, as well as the birth rate - especially the infant - despite the wars, the bloody and
protracted conflicts in many parts of the continent, with interventions by the
ex-colonial powers, multinationals, the financial system through the debt
mechanism or the clear interference of other powers. The growth of the African population's weight in the world has been constant as it has been observed
recently.
There is a
varied and interwoven classification of causes in African conflicts. Africa, like the Middle East, are the regions with the most frequent and
bloody conflicts in the last twenty years. Many are (or
were) the result of tribal conflicts, where the idea of nation-state did not
exist (essentially South Sahel) but imposed by the colonial powers before
leaving the land; the direct conflicts between constituted nation-states
are rarer.
This relative
stability of the frontiers inherited from colonial times reveals, precisely,
the absence of a state tradition and hence for Africans, it is relatively
indifferent to the tracing of frontiers, crossed as naturally as ever by people.
There have not
been, and there are not, wars that have taken place in Europe, in which nationalism
has taken root in the macabre idea of the nineteenth
century that every nation should correspond to a nation state, all judging
themselves with rights to territories on the other side of their frontiers, often
taken as provisional. After the Second World War, in Europe, the only border
wars occurred in the context of the dismantling of Yugoslavia or, more
recently, with the Russian annexation of the Crimea and the de facto separation of the eastern
regions of Ukraine (Donetsk and Lugansk), in the scope of state entities with
frontiers of recent constitution. The constitution of
the European Union and the Schengen area have taken away meaning from
borders, and new wars of territorial conquest are not imaginable.
In Africa, the
idea of respecting the colonial frontiers, however aberrant they might have
been, was accepted in the scene of decolonization, with some bloody exceptions. For example, Ethiopia and Eritrea were separated after years of war; the same happened in Sudan where the south, mostly populated by Nilotic and
non-Muslim peoples, separated from the north, with Arab and Islamic
preponderance, in a process of sharing of oil deposits not yet complete and
prolonged in South Sudan by a war between the two main tribes (Dinkas and Nuer).
In the process
of colonization, Somalia was divided up by France, Great Britain and Italy and,
in a second phase, the last two parcels joined in a single state, being the
small Gallic part (the small Djibouti, now curdled with bases of foreign
military rivals) later acceding to independence. Meanwhile,
Somalia and Ethiopia went to war for control of Ethiopian East (Ogaden)
populated by Somali herders, with the defeat of Somalia. Later on, the Somali civil war originated, on the one hand, the secession
of the northern part (Somaliland, the old British colony) against the greater
part of the country, to the south where a civil war continues.
It is
interesting to note the political sensitivity of the United States. In 1993 they decided to disembark in Somalia in order to impose the law and
the order of the Empire, before the television cameras; but the
operation ended badly with dead marines dragged down the streets of Mogadishu. After this setback, the Pentagon, in its high wisdom, pushed to pacify Somalia ... the Ethiopian army that had been at war with Somalia
a few years earlier, in addition to old rivalries. As things went
bad for the Ethiopians, the US enticed the neighbors to the south, the Kenyans
to pacify Somalia; and from where they resulted, in Kenyan
territory, attacks that the Somali al-Shaabab came to unleash. At the same time, the diffuse but wise
"international community" has decided to stop merchant ships in
Somali waters from assaulting communities of hungry fishermen and water
contaminated by hospital waste dumped by Westerners. In this effort,
it is known that a Portuguese frigate seized a rubber boat [1] with half a dozen Somalis on board and in international waters; a heroic intervention that must have given rise to half a ton of medals and awards ...
Also in the case
of Western Sahara, the colonial borders were not respected. First, because Morocco occupied the territory that Spain abandoned to its fate; that is, gave carte blanche to the master of the Makhzen, to seize the concession
of fishing rights and phosphates, leading to the flight
of part of the population to refugee camps in Algeria, given the lack of
interest of the "international community" and the impotence of the
UN.
Among the wars
of independence, there are those carried out in Kenya, Algeria, Guinea Bissau,
Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia.
The inheritance
of the colonial frontiers was embodied in the invention of
nation-states, in most cases where they had never existed, as mosaics of
ethnicities and cultures. Without the unifying and repressive presence of the
colonial power, internal conflicts of various kinds arose between groups or
warlords based on their tribes, albeit without secessionist objectives but only
to control the state apparatus. These include Angola, DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Mozambique, Central African Republic,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan (Darfur) or Uganda.
There are
typical cases of extractivism and banditry (ivory business) such as that of the
Lord's Army in Uganda, with incursions abroad; and the ruthless
groups in eastern Congo, who are masters of the extraction and export of
diamonds and "rare earths" that rival the historical predation
practiced by the Lords of Kinshasa, be it Mobutu or the Kabila family, heirs of
a territory that the colonial powers, in the 19th century delivered to a
criminal, the king of the Belgians. And the
genocidal practices carried out in Rwanda, where only a demented local ability
- encouraged by the Belgian colonizer - could distinguish Tutsis from Hutus or
vice versa cannot be forgotten; knowing that this distinction has more of a
sociological than ethnic-cultural character, it has been used for a
redistribution of lands where the population density is great.
The secessionist
examples recalled above were successful, but there were some that were not,
such as the Biafra case that was cherished by the Portuguese fascist regime, by
France and oil companies that tried the independence from Nigeria, with a hunger ballast that became famous. Catanga, in the 1960s, was the object of a secessionist project around
Tchombé, a marionette of mining companies that worked in the region and with
great friends in the Portuguese fascist government. Cabinda is
another case that has been dragging on for decades, with no results favouring
secessionists. And the post-colonial unification project between
Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde was ephemeral, with the separation done
peacefully.
Today, in Mali, there
is a conflict anchored in an al Qaeda branch (the AQMI) that is developing a
project of separation of the Tuareg population, divided between several nation
states that seldom, in history, had suffered restrictions of circulation in the
desert, in communications between the Sahel and the Mediterranean. Libya, where Western intervention for the sharing of the country's energy
wealth has led to the revival of differences and conflicts between Cyrenaica,
Tripolitania and the southern tribes, with ancestral affinities with the Tuareg
world.
The civil war in
Algeria in the 1990s is a typical case of social and political struggle, where
ethnic and cultural cleavages have not played a decisive role. On the one hand, there was the power of the FLN, which remains in
power after the war of independence against the French; and on the other, an Islamic fundamentalist group -
the FIS - that entered the armed struggle after an electoral clarification was blocked. In this context, barbarism and killings have, as usual, hit the general
population.
Meanwhile, in
South Africa, the racist regime of apartheid was abolished under the aegis of the wise figure of Mandela. However, the black bourgeoisie, assuming political power, also shifted to
the world of business, in parallel with the white bourgeoisie forced to accept
sharing, without the stupid recourse to the separation of "races" -
"the business must go on ". The Bantustans have disappeared, but for the overwhelming majority of the
population of African origin, integration has accelerated in the great urban
peripheries, where the marriage between poverty and violence develops,
characterizing the enormous tin neighborhoods; with the elegant
buildings inhabited by the white minority and the privileged blacks, nearby, at
sight. In ancient Rhodesia, on the other hand, the power of
the European minority was also replaced by a black bourgeoisie, whose greatest
exponent is Mugabe, only recently descending, leaving behind poverty and the
record of the highest inflation recorded in history.
Apart from these last two cases that survived the late expulsion of the Portuguese
from their old colonies, the general situation of power in Africa is that of
small oligarchies of very rich people; and, as it is known behind a
great wealth there is always a great robbery, in any latitude. Of civilian origin or in military uniform - in the body or in the closet -
these oligarchs rule, at least badly, as a faithful copy of the European
oligarchies. The economic structures are not comparable in terms of
diversification and are very focused on the exploitation of agricultural crops
with global demand or mining extraction where multinationals of various origins
dominate. Although, even on a global scale, there are already
African millionaires, especially Nigerians, with the name Isabel dos Santos in a position in the top ten that we do not know if it will
keep up with the change of power in Angola, nothing favorable to traditional famiglia Santos.
The sequels of
this development model, sponsored by global institutions - the World Bank, the
WTO and the IMF - generate an interaction between environmentally disastrous
projects, from monoculture plantations, to the abandonment of rural communities
to refuge in cities or emigration. States, dominated by predatory
oligarchies, among measures to attract foreign investment, coupled with the
absence of elementary infrastructures and evidence of public deficits,
stimulate IMF intervention (usually accepted) in view of an illusory
contraction of debt, even after plans for privatizations and loss of quality of
life for the population have been implemented; a mechanism of
general application that has nothing innovative, nor has Africa
as the only destination.
This collapse of
the traditional communities causes the abandonment of the lands, the displacement
to the cities that cannot receive such influxes of people, abandoned by the
so-called public powers. If these cities pile up millions of poor
people in neighborhoods and suburbs, without health conditions, violence, but
where a diversified informal economy boils. In Africa,
megacities are growing fast, with notable numbers being the 13 million
inhabitants of Cairo, Kinshasa or Nairobi, where the world's largest (Kibera)
neighborhood is estimated to have 2.5 million people.
Emigration,
especially to Europe, comes from ingenious
and / or dangerous ways of crossing the
Mediterranean, where storms and the encounter with
maritime police or Frontex agents are common ; these last ones that rival in
the form of solving nothing fundamental, bordering to the confinement and the
arrest for later repatriation . It is well known that the use of police to solve
social problems can only have circumstantial results, never structural, and
still less have effects on geopolitical
imbalances . For its part, NATO, with the operation Active Endeavor until 2016 and, after that date, with the operation Sea
Guardian did not solve anything; not even the action of mob gangs who carry out all kinds of
violence on the candidates for entry into Europe.
Surveillance in
the Mediterranean serves above all for Europeans to fall asleep in the lap of
their virtuous political classes; even if the results only show
their disabilities.
The difficulties
of this crossing and the situation of "illegal" or "without
papers" are mixed elements of valorization and submission by those who
surpass them. Of value, because immigrants seek a less miserable and
dangerous life than the ones lived in their countries of origin; on the other hand, many will have to submit to the most disqualified strata
of European entrepreneurship, who know how to have in immigrants a mass of
people whom they can press, steal, kidnap and pay miserably, using their
disgrace, the few rights they have recognized, to increase their profits and
press down the prices prevailing in the global European "labour
market".
This fiercely
competitive model affects a large part of European societies and promotes
structural unemployment, the fragmentation of work performance, widespread
precariousness in life, instills an environment of fear, of stupid channeling
of discontent and fear to the repulsion of the Other (African and / or Islamic
immigrant), and racism and xenophobia institutionalized in fascist parties (Le
Pen, AfD, Fidesz, Lega Nord ...). These take advantage of the
drift towards a neoliberalism assailed by the parties enrolled in the EPP and S
& D gangs that dominate the majority of national political classes within
the EU. In this reactionary drift, the "left"
parties that seek to win more votes approach the positions of the center to
access the pot, than to contribute to an alternative to the oligarchic
political system and the capitalist model.
2 - Demographic profile of African geopolitical areas
As we proceeded
for Europe, we divided Africa into three sets of territories[2] . One of them is North Africa bordering the southern Mediterranean, Muslim,
Arab and Berber, in its essential and confronting Europe on the north bank,
Gibraltar and Spain to a few thirteen kilometers, but also very close to Malta
and Sicily. A second set of countries, which we named Africa -
Anchors, was chosen for reasons of economic or demographic potential or given
their importance in the areas where they are and which therefore show
themselves as the anchors that mark the march of the continent; even though there are no contiguities between them. And finally, the
remaining countries, some larger than others, usually poor, little articulated
internally or without a particularly large population.
Primary source: CNUCED /
UNCTAD
As can be seen
in the graph there is a regular evolution and no retreats, being sensible the
difference of rhythm between North Africa and the other sets; which is accentuated in the forecasts for 2050. The strongest foreseeable
growth is recorded in the set of the 43 countries
included in Africa-Other, whose population will be multiplied by eight in
relation to 1970.
2.1 - North Africa
Five countries
of very ancient civilization are closely related to Europe and the Middle East. In the first case, with the settlement of Greeks, Macedonians, Romans and, fleetingly
Byzantine; and much later with French,Italian (Libya) and English
colonization (Egypt). In the second case, with the arrival of the
Phoenicians, founders of Carthage, with the first wave of Muslim expansion in
the seventh century, whose culture became dominant throughout North Africa
since then, even when the inclusion of the south coast of the Mediterranean in
the Ottoman sphere of influence took place. Conversely, the
presence of North Africans in Europe only occurred following the destruction of
the Visigothic state in the Peninsula Iberian Peninsula in 711 and
for more than seven centuries, as well as in Sicily, Malta or Cyprus, much less
durable.
·
Libya has until 1990 the highest rates of annual
population growth in the region (3.8 to 5.1%) being exceeded by Egypt since
then, but maintaining rates of just
over 2% and including in the forecasts for 2050 (1.8% per year);
·
Libya, which in the decade ending in 2010 had an
average population growth rate of 1.5%, only shows a rate of 0.3% in the
2000/2016 hexennium. The causes are well-known and relate to the war that the NATO powers have made to Libya - a dangerous
country with only 6.1 M inhabitants - to seize
their energy riches, which have been divided according to the bombings
and which was a slap in the face of Barak Obama's Nobel Peace Prize laureates
in 2009;
·
Morocco has the lowest rate of population growth in
the region for the period 1970-2000 (2.7%), replaced by Tunisia in the first decade of this century and by Libya in the following hexennium, as mentioned above;
·
In this century, after a general fall in the rate of
population growth, there has been an increase in rates in all countries except Libya, in the six years ending in
2016, as already explained;
·
As for the forecasts for 2050, they see a general fall
in population increases of between 1.8% for Egypt and 0.6% for Tunisia. The only exception is Libya, owing to the exceptional
nature of the past few years, and it may not be possible, given the internal
conflict in the country, between the various tribes, mainly Cyrenaica and
Tripolitania, since NATO intervention.
2.2 - Africa - Anchors
In this set we have
considered six countries. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and
open to the oil extraction of multinationals that sows an environmental
disaster in the vicinity of the Niger Delta. Nigeria fits a diverse blanket of ethnicities, languages and creeds,
Islam being dominant; and it has in its recent history a past with various
state organizations, especially the caliphates of Sokoto and Bornu, among
others, fought and subjected by French and English colonization in the 19th and
20th centuries. Nigeria has internally the problem of Boko Haram, a
fanatic group linked to ISIS / Daesh and characterized by abductions and
massacres; a problem that adds to the advance of the drought that
pushes population from north to south, provoking reactions increased by
ethnic-religious differences.
Egypt, also previously
considered in the geopolitical area of
North Africa, is the most populous Arab-speaking country, with a small
minority of Coptic population and whose history goes back several thousand
years before the common era; it is one of the three oldest state units, with China and
Iran the other two. Recently, there was an elected president - Morsi -
affection for the Muslim Brotherhood but, not being accepted by the military or
the US, Egypt returned to a dictatorial military regime, as usual. It has in Sinai the regular performance of the ISIS / Daesh and an
uncomfortable neighborhood made up of Israel and Saudi Arabia. Its strategic relevance derives from the control of this jugular navigation
route which is the Suez Canal.
South Africa,
another dense flap of languages and ethnicities, has the particularity of
including a large minority of descendants of Europeans and a smaller minority
of Asians, of whom Gandhi was a hundred years ago. It is the
country with the greatest global wealth in Africa, with very unequal
distribution, high poverty and corruption, despite the extinction of apartheid.
Angola has lived
out of its wealth of oil and diamonds, the benefits of which have been
appropriated by an oligarchy of kleptocrats, with very close links with the
Portuguese political class; and where many thousands of Portuguese work. On the other hand, it is a destructured country, with enormous poverty and
huge infrastructural deficiencies.
Ivory Coast was
governed for thirty years by a megalomaniac oligarch - Houphouet-Boigny, an
example of "black with a white mask" as Fanon would say; and who built a huge and sumptuous basilica in his homeland, inland. Its succession led to bloody conflicts that forced the UN military
intervention. It has global relevance in several agricultural products
of world importance, such as cacao, the cotton and the oil of palm.
Finally, Kenya
stands out as the main hub of the continent's east coast and Mombasa was the
port chosen by China to be its main warehouse in the western Indian Ocean,
within the framework of the commercial network that is under way.
As it has been
noted, countries whose economic, demographic or geographic size have attracted
attraction in their respective surrounding areas have been chosen as anchors,
in addition to what has already been said about North Africa.
·
The highest rates of annual population growth are in
Côte d'Ivoire until 2000, and the indicator for the 1970s and 1980s (5.8%) is
the highest among all the countries in this group over the period considered. However, in the periods that define the present
century, there is a marked decrease in the population dynamics in the country,
resulting from the two periods of civil war - 2002/07 and 2010/11 - that
occurred in the country;
·
Also in the time period contained in this century, the
highest rates of population growth among the six countries show in Angola (4.2%
and 3.9% in 2000/10 and 2010/16) and the reasons will certainly be related to the end of the civil war in 2002; an inversion compared to the one described above for
Côte d'Ivoire, whose period of turbulence was in the first decade of the
century. In Angola, the comparatively low population increase
in the 1970s and 1980s, (2.4% and 3.2%, respectively) corresponds to the final
period of the struggle for independence and, later on, the civil war. The wars that have dragged on for 27 years having
killed 500,000 people;
·
The decline in population growth rates is practically
constant over the period considered in the case of Kenya, Egypt and particularly
in South Africa which incidentally has the most reduced among the anchor
countries, from the period 1980/90, still in the time of apartheid;
·
Nigeria, which has the lowest rates of population
growth in Angola in the period 1950-70, has a constant value of around 3% per
year;
·
As for forecasts for 2050, the highest population
dynamism is Angola (4.8% per year) and the lowest in South Africa (0.9%),
where, over time, there has been a slow but steady outflow of population
of European origin. Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire are also countries where the
population growth rate is expected to rise till 2050 (3.6% and 3.4%, respectively). Finally, there is also a decline in population dynamics in Egypt (1.8%) and
a continuation in Kenya for the hexennium ended in 2016.
2.3 - Africa - remaining countries (43 )
Up to 1990 there
is a balance between the sum of the combined population of North Africa and the
Anchor countries compared to the other African
countries - in the order of 110 people in the latter per 100 inhabitants in the
former. This ratio began to change gradually to about 116 in 2000, 125 in 2010 and 130 in 2016, being estimated that in
2050 this ratio will be 156. This tendency to materialize, reveals a significant change in the distribution throughout the territory, of the
African population and that could result from the less attraction of the Anchor
countries for the capture of population in the neighboring regions,
exacerbating the social situation in the latter. On the other
hand, Europe, maintaining low levels of economic growth, along with increased
animosity and xenophobia towards migrants and refugees, may not be an
opportunity for many Africans, especially those from demographic pressure to
coincide with economic stagnation; or where armed conflicts
unfold, with their courtship of violence over the population, massive
displacement, looted or destroyed assets, refugee camps, or extension of the
sprawling slums.
More
optimistically, it can be assumed that this trend of increasing levels of
population may be accompanied by a greater capacity in these 43 other countries
to fit their own natural resources, in a logic that is not adherent to the
reality of "sustained growth", as a rule, quite uneven; or the emergence among the latter of new anchors that could create new
flows of internal displacement in Africa with the creation of new centralities.
Taking into
account, the geopolitical twitches that are consolidating, mainly between US
and Russia / China; the continuity or deepening of inequalities
between countries; the very disintegration within many of these nation states,
with the increase of social conflicts transformed into ethnic and religious, in
the case of Africa; taking into account their disarticulation, is all reminded by René Dumont's 1962 warning in his book "Africa
Begins Badly" that today could be rewritten with a new title, "Africa
Continues Evil", with eventual edition following an
"Africa Goes to Worse".
It is not
convenient, however tedious, to give a description of the situation in each of
the 43 African countries grouped here, we restrict ourselves to the larger
ones, from the demographic point of view.
·
In 2016, Ethiopia is the only one of these countries
with more than 100 M inhabitants, even though it separated from Eritrea in 1993.
Eritrea, with 3.4 million inhabitants in 2000, had been incorporated - as if it
were an Ethiopia by the emperor Haile Selassie in 1951 by Great Britain,
without taking into account cultural, religious and linguistic differences; a 31-year war that ended only in 1991. So, from the
demographic point of view, if the separation of Eritrea was not relevant in
Ethiopia, the same cannot be said of the fact that the latter has no longer
access direct to the coast;
·
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the second
most populous country of this set with 79 M inhabitants in 2016. Rich in
natural resources, it remains one of the poorest countries in the world, revealing the field of traditional
kleptocracy in power ( Mobutu for 32 years and the Kabila family to this day) ; and the dismantling of the country in regions dominated by oligarchic
powers and mafia militias, in articulation with the interests of international
capital, most recently centered on the coveted “rare earths”;
·
In the following places, in terms of population size
in 2016, Tanzania (56 M), Uganda (41 M) and Sudan (40 M) followed, with South
Sudan (12 M) broke up in 2011, after a long war with Sudan (north); and that it continues in a state of war, internally, since then, in addition to a litigation with Sudan on
the sharing of oil resources;
·
The smallest countries in Africa are the Seychelles and São Tomé and Príncipe,
respectively with 200 thousand and 94 thousand inhabitants in 2016. The
Seychelles constitute, in the case of the capital movements that Portugal has as a part, a second-line offshore ; and, S. Tomé and Príncipe, only in 2016 appears in
this "market" as it can be observed here ;
·
For the period 1970/2016, the highest annual average
rates of population growth (there is no case of decrease as we
have observed in Europe) are recorded in Western Sahara (13.1%), occupied by
Morocco; in Djibouti (10.7%) where there is a real bottling of
foreign military bases; Niger (7.8%), Gambia (7.7%) and Uganda (7.4%),
including Uganda (41 M) and Niger (21 M) have a large population in 2016.
Conversely, Seychelles (1.7%) and Cape Verde (2.2%), which, as we know, are
archipelagos, in the second case with a traditional and strong emigration; Lesotho (2.5%) which is a monarchy in South Africa; the Central African Republic (3.3%) where there is a
war for the domain of gold mines; and
Guinea-Bissau (3.4%) where contaminated waste from advanced countries converges
and drug movements to Europe;
·
In the chapter of the forecasts for 2050, all the
demographic growth rates are inferior to the corresponding ones registered in
the period 1970/2016; however , there are situations where the differences are
minimal - Mali and Burundi;
·
The largest population growth up to 2050 is for Sahel,
Niger (6.8%), slightly below the 1970/2016 indicator and well above the next
highest for Uganda (4.6%) and the Republic Democratic Republic of Congo and
Tanzania (4.4%), three of the four most populous countries among the 43
countries included in the Other ;
·
Still, with respect to forecasts for 2050, the lowest
annual population dynamics fall in Seychelles (0.1%) , Djibouti, Cape Verde
(1.1%) , Lesotho (1.3%) , Botswana (1.5%) , Swaziland (1.6%) , Namibia and
Sierra Leone (2.2%). In the cases of the Seychelles and Cape Verde, the
continuation of the low population growth backwards registered for the period
1970/2016 is underlined. Among the others that we highlight, there is a clear
presence of countries that surround South Africa that will only grow from the
population point of view 0.9% per year until 2050.
The following
map mirrors the demographic evolution of African countries expected for 2050
(in% annual growth).
·
It is very clearly observed that the lowest rates of
population growth are concentrated exclusively in the North and South of the
continent (red and orange);
·
In turn, the highest growth rates are roughly concentrated
between the Sahel and the Indian (blue and green), dispersed areas with
intermediate values for population growth (yellow).
Evolution of the African population in 2050 compared to 2016
Coming soon - same approach
for Asia
This and other texts in:
Africa - Anchors – South
Africa, Angola, Ivory Coast, Egipt, Nigeria e Kenya
Africa – Others – All
the other 43 countries
(the inclusion of Egypt in
North Africa and as a Anchor is intentional)
Sem comentários:
Enviar um comentário