Within the context of some narrowing of Europe’s
inequalities, Portugal is a country with evident relative impoverishment.
1 - Evolution of per capita GDP
2 – Households’ gross income
3 - Those labor
costs
We have recently
carried on a synthetic explanation of the inequalities in the EU, which are
the consequence of a process that has taken place over the past 45 years. And we used the word synthetic because we have privileged an indicator
- demographic evolution - which clearly reflects the evolution of the position of
each European region in the hierarchy built by the current neoliberal capitalism.
In this paper, we will observe those inequalities between
countries at the light of per capita GDP, household income, and business’ costs
with labor, including some details related to what has been going on in Portugal.
1 - Evolution of per capita GDP
The evolution
of per capita GDP for the EU-28 group, measured in euros, for the period of 1970
to 2014, shows a very rapid growth until 1990, with a slowdown in the next five
years, a recovery in the decade of 1995 to 2005, with the later period ending with
a very weak growth, subsequent to the systemic political, economic, and financial
crisis, which continues to grow deeper.
Primary source: UNCTAD / CNUCED
A more
detailed look enables seeing the average yearly growth rate of the GDP per
capita for each of the five-year periods, thus evidencing the shorter fluctuations
that make up the long cycle that was started by the appearance of neoliberalism
around the early 70's of the last century.
In the second
half of the 1990s, several technological innovations or their massification (internet,
mobile phones) gave a strong impulse to globalization and businesses, but neoliberalism,
through the financial transformation drive, relocations, deindustrialization, and
social deregulation, led to so-called "dot.com" crisis at the turn of
the century. Because the process
became more pronounced, with real estate bubbles, subprime lending, all based
on credit without the counterpart of effective income to pay for it, the crisis
intensified, with bank failures, states’ indebtedness, ineffective austerity programs,
and the anemic growth that we have been witnessing, without an end in sight, as
is clearly visible in the following chart.
Primary source: UNCTAD / CNUCED
Next we observe
the variation of the GDP per capita for each country between 1970 and 2014,
using as a reference for each of them the aggregate value of the EU-28 = 100.
Primary source: UNCTAD / CNUCED
This long period
corresponds to the time of affirmation and consolidation of neoliberalism that,
meanwhile, could possibly be in an exhaustion phase regarding its economic, social
and political model. It shows, in a first
approach, that in all the countries considered as developed the GDP per capita increased
slightly (3.9%) when compared to the EU-28, while
for the world as a whole, this GDP per capita is reduced by 12.7%, in the same comparative
terms. Obviously, by exclusion of parts, for the
group of least developed countries (which are benevolently labeled as developing
countries by the international institutions and include all other non-OECD countries)
the situation is very unflattering; as unflattering
is the situation of the peoples considered to be developed by the OECD - Hungary,
Poland, Turkey, Mexico ... - just because they belong to that club. A championship classification earned in the administration
office...
In undeveloped
countries the GDP per capita might have regressed, in comparison with the EU-28,
more than the world average, revealing that the consequences of a world economic
order – which, historically, generates inequalities – remain quite active.
One may
consider that, meanwhile, the population of the undeveloped countries has grown
substantially, more than the GDP; but this cannot be the basis for defending Malthusian policies,
but rather political and economic changes that eliminate the alliance between
these countries’ political classes, autocratic and corrupt, and the predator multinationals
that plunder the riches and promote devastating environmental disasters, in
addition to the pinchers with which the global financial system, through debt[1], dominates the poor and peripheral countries.
Relative to
the EU average, some of the wealth framework’s top countries have lost their position. This is particularly true in Switzerland (-28.5%), Sweden, Italy,
France, the Netherlands, and Denmark. With a large
loss when compared to the EU average, Greece stands out because despite not being
a rich country it has substantially declined in recent years, for reasons that
are well known.
Those cases
where there was a big approach to the EU-28 levels are found among the recently
added countries, mainly to the east (resulting from the breakup of the Soviet bloc
and having being subject to deep intervention by foreign capital, while maintaining
low wages vis the Community average) or, to the South (Malta and Cyprus), in addition
to Ireland.
We also
note a geographically diverse group of countries showing positive growth of the
GDP per capita relative to the Community average, that growth being, however, relatively
modest. In this group we highlight the
cases of Germany (4.1%), Belgium (1.5%), Great Britain (6.2%), Spain (0.6%), and
even Portugal (11.4%), in the last two cases because of overly evident reasons.
As one would
expect, there is nothing here that can be specifically related to the single currency,
but rather to the anti-democratic nature of the European institutions intended to
promote or interact with capitalism’s development inequalities, which have deep
roots in history and generate poor, less poor, and rich regions, as we
recently documented.
There are rich
countries with their own currencies that lost position relatively to the EU average
(Sweden and Denmark, for example, in addition to Switzerland which is not integrated
in the EU but only in the European Economic Area); others, equally rich and using the euro, raised further above
the EU average (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg); a number of countries that subscribe to the euro, and which are
considered to be wealthy, are seen in decline compared to the aforementioned average
GDP per capita (France, the Netherlands, Italy); several poor or balanced countries show gains in relation to the
EU-28 average, with or without the adoption of the euro as their currency.
Finally, we highlight the Germany case, the export engine
of the EU, the big gatherer of financial surpluses, the single currency inspirational
country and the politically dominant country, that does not manage to improve its
position in relation to the Community average by more than 4.1%, in what
concerns the GDP per capita, in the span of 44 years.
The following
chart identifies, among the selected times, those in which each country had the
best or the worst ratio of their per capita income in the period of 1970-2014,
as compared with the EU-28 average at the same time points (best years in blue
and worst years in red).
Primary source: UNCTAD / UNCTAD
In 1970, eleven
situations of greater deviation from the Community average show up, including one
of the founders - Belgium - and some of the richest countries, such as Austria or
Norway, the latter which, by then, still had to start exploiting oil in the North
Sea. Among the other countries we highlight
Portugal in the last years of the colonial and fascist regime. Also in that distant year, rich countries such as Denmark, Holland,
Sweden, Switzerland, and "the World" appear at their moment of greatest
advantage over the community average.
The year of
1995 appears as the worst year for most Eastern European countries, former members
the recently dismembered Soviet bloc and also for two countries of the former Yugoslavia,
as well as Sweden, which suffered a deep crisis at that time. That year, on the other hand, was the most favorable, when compared
to the EU-28 average, for countries such as Germany, Belgium, Italy, and all the
"developed countries".
Curiously, the
year 2000 is the best year only for Portugal and S. Marino. 2005 and 2014 are the ones sharing the largest number of best
years, including countries that would come to be targeted (Cyprus, Spain and Ireland)
or with serious financial problems (Iceland and Great Britain) following the crisis
that began in late 2007.
Finally, 2014
is shown to be the most favorable, when compared to the EU-28 average, for several
Eastern European countries as well as for Austria and Malta; but, on the other hand, it is the worst for Denmark, France and
Italy, apart from Greece, which won’t surprise anyone.
During such
a long span of time the hierarchy of the countries on the European scene has undergone
some changes that are related to political and geostrategic changes and, above all,
to the way each of these countries fits into a globalized and dynamic space. The relations between center and periphery are remade every day but,
at a very aggregate level, usually do not suffer heavy mutations. Let's look at these mutations in the area of GDP per capita.
Evolution of
the hierarchy of GDP per capita in some European countries
1970
|
1980
|
1990
|
1995
|
2000
|
2005
|
2010
|
2014
|
|
No. of countries considered
|
28
|
28
|
28
|
34
|
34
|
34
|
34
|
34
|
Cyprus
|
21
|
20
|
19
|
19
|
19
|
19
|
19
|
19
|
Slovenia
|
-
|
-
|
-
|
22
|
22
|
22
|
21
|
20
|
Spain
|
18
|
19
|
18
|
18
|
18
|
18
|
18
|
18
|
Greece
|
19
|
18
|
20
|
20
|
20
|
20
|
20
|
21
|
Ireland
|
17
|
16
|
16
|
13
|
6
|
5
|
6
|
5
|
Italy
|
16
|
16
|
16
|
16
|
17
|
17
|
17
|
17
|
Malta
|
26
|
24
|
22
|
23
|
23
|
23
|
23
|
22
|
Portugal
|
20
|
21
|
21
|
21
|
21
|
21
|
22
|
23
|
Primary source: UNCTAD / UNCTAD
Several countries
have improved their ranking in this championship, especially Ireland which moved
from the second half of the table in 1970 to a place near the podium in the present
century. Also winners
are Cyprus, Slovenia, and Malta, despite the troika intervention in the first,
all coming to be ahead of Portugal in 2014. Spain
and Italy maintain a stable position throughout the period, despite the difficulties
of their financial systems and austerity. Greece
and Portugal show clear losses in their positions, being more pronounced and evident
in the Portuguese case, and it is also worth noting that, despite the greater violence
of the troika intervention in Greece, throughout the whole period it maintains
a ranking less unfavorable than Portugal, as we pointed out four years ago.
2 – Households’
gross income
If we take the
available gross income of households in EU countries, per person, and if in each
year we allocate the index 100 to the income per person within the average Portuguese
family, we can estimate the approximation or distancing of both richer and poorer
countries. For the EU as a
whole the resulting evolution of available income, taking as a base the value relative
to Portugal, is shown in the graph below.
In 2003/04,
the average income of a Community’s family was 26% higher than that of a member
of a Portuguese family. In 2005, there was
a sharp fall in this distance which means an approach to the EU's overall income
levels, continuing to have values close to 20% until 2010, when the closest
approach of the whole period can be seen.
The troika intervention and austerity have widened
the gap to EU-28 average income, which in 2015 stood 24.5% above the then standard
in Portugal.
Primary Source: Eurostat
Keeping the
comparison with the Portuguese situation (index 100), the detail of the evolution
of all countries between 2003 and 2008 and between the latter and 2014, reveals
that there is a narrowing of the distances relatively to the richest countries in
2008, but then the gap widens sharply in 2014 due to austerity, the debt
tourniquet, the collapse of the financial system, the impoverishment of the
general population, and to the devoted performance of the Passos government. In 2014, despite Portugal’s poor social situation, some countries
that in 2008 were less distant from rich countries are, more recently, showing a
lower average income than Portugal – Cyprus, Slovenia, and Greece. It should also be emphasized that there is a marked fall in the
distance between the average Spanish income and the Portuguese level; if in 2003 the average income of a member of a Spanish family
was 24.9% higher than that registered in Portugal, in 2014 it was 9.9%, having
been 15.2% in the intermediate year.
2003
|
2008
|
2014
|
|
Germany
|
152.8
|
146.7
|
163.0
|
Austria
|
155.8
|
148.8
|
155.0
|
Belgium
|
147.3
|
134.6
|
143.4
|
Bulgaria**
|
38.9
|
45.8
|
54.4
|
Cyprus
|
109.1
|
130.2
|
97.4
|
Croatia
|
69.6
|
70.0
|
74.4
|
Denmark
|
125.3
|
118.8
|
133.3
|
Slovakia
|
65.3
|
79.6
|
93.8
|
Slovenia
|
99.4
|
101.0
|
96.8
|
Spain
|
124.9
|
115.2
|
109.9
|
Estonia
|
57.0
|
73.5
|
78.4
|
Finland
|
120.5
|
127.9
|
138.2
|
France
|
147.2
|
137.6
|
145.6
|
Greece
|
122.0
|
121.6
|
90.3
|
Netherlands**
|
150.9
|
145.0
|
136.8
|
Hungary
|
75.5
|
69.4
|
78.5
|
Ireland
|
126.9
|
124.3
|
113.0
|
Iceland**
|
124.7
|
130.7
|
119.7
|
Italy
|
141.4
|
133.2
|
123.4
|
Latvia
|
54.5
|
73.8
|
70.8
|
Lithuania *
|
69.6
|
78.1
|
90.4
|
Norway
|
151.8
|
146.7
|
166.1
|
Poland
|
64.5
|
67.5
|
85.4
|
Portugal
|
100.0
|
100.0
|
100.0
|
United Kingdom
|
155.1
|
139.6
|
132.1
|
Czech Republic
|
88.8
|
84.1
|
93.3
|
Romania
|
33.8
|
53.1
|
56.5
|
Sweden
|
134.4
|
132.0
|
138.4
|
Switzerland**
|
159.4
|
157.2
|
171.6
|
* 2004 ** 2013 Primary Source: Eurostat
|
3 - Those labour costs
Official statistics
clearly reflect the capitalism’s logic and the mercantilist view of reality. For example, Eurostat has information on the cost of labor, worried
that it is with the efficient investments and the competitiveness of companies and
to assess the extent to which the charges with workers are compatible with those
elements central to the logic of capital.
The labour costs
include wages, as well as employers’ contributions to social security and other
elements related to the work and workers. In the typical neoliberal logic companies are the ones creating
jobs and, therefore, the workers should wait and pray for their turn to fit into
the working world, submissively, hardworking, and grateful for the benefit of a
salary. Although income from work is central to workers
and their families, entrepreneurs do not assess whether or not those wages endow
life tranquility to the lives of those who work, or whether such income has a high
or low purchasing power; they consider that it is
the responsibility of the State to ensure an acceptable level of poverty, through
social or police action, and that the supporting funds should come from taxes that
do not bear on enterprise costs or pinch the sacrosanct competitiveness.
Really important
to the common capitalist is to free himself from all costs, pursuing the impossible
dream of matching the sales volume to profits, a lost battle since being competitive
requires constant investment and this tends to reduce the weight of the labour costs
in the costs’ total, although the wages’ mass is considered to be the most manageable
element.
In the following
graph we compare the relationship between the total labor costs in the country wherever
they are higher (usually Norway) and Portugal; the relationship between those costs in Portugal and the European
country where they are the lowest (Bulgaria); and
also the evolution of the comparison between the EU average and the costs observed
in Portugal.
Primary Source: Eurostat
In 2000 the
cost of one wage in Norway was slightly lower than that of three workers in Portugal. As of 2012, this ratio remains relatively stable in terms of a
situation where the income of a Norwegian equals that of four workers in Portugal.
To this effect concur the large growth observed in the Scandinavian
country between 2008 and 2012, having regressed somewhat since then, and the absolute
stagnation of the wages’ costs in Portugal, in the fifteen years considered, especially
since 2012.
From this situation
it cannot be concluded, in a simplistic way, that Norwegians are expensive and have
"low competitiveness" or that they are four times more productive than
a Portuguese worker, working in Portugal. It is a result, rather, of the social organization, the technological
and managerial levels, the quality of the political system, of the public administration,
the utilization of the tax burden, of economic or social rights, and education levels.
If we look at
the evolution of wages’ costs between Portugal and Bulgaria there is a clear approximation,
given the very low levels observed in the Balkan country at the beginning of the
century (1.3 euros / hour) and growing to 4.1 euros in 2015. During the same period,
in Portugal, labor costs went from 11.1 to 13.2 euros, an increase that certainly
would not prevent any business in Portugal, were it not for the decapitalization
and indebtedness of companies, weak management capacities and a productive standard
that competes directly with Asia and Latin America in the supply of consumer and
intermediate goods to the more developed countries of Europe. It is the productive standard, the incorporation of technologies
allowing high levels of productivity that enable Norway to not feel affected by
the low Bulgarian salaries, although the labor costs in this country are, in 2015,
12.5 times lower than in Norway.
Even within
a framework of capitalism, the capabilities of the Portuguese capitalists lead nowhere. In those activities where natural conditions are better or where
the qualifications of its workers are adequate, Portugal will tend to see these
sectors become dominated by foreign capital, mainly Spanish, given the geographical
and cultural proximity between Portugal and Spain, the former being seen as, at
a global level, an Iberian and European periphery. And to be considered as a complement to a Spain that has 4.5 times
the population, which is more educated, and this in spite of both being still suffering
the effects of austerity, unemployment and industrial or financial restructuring
processes.
The impoverishment
and stagnation of labor costs in Portugal, when compared to the moderate increase
in the EU average, caused that, in 2000, the average European cost of one person’s
work-hour corresponded to that of 1.5 Portuguese workers, the value having reached
1.89 in the past year. And, as we know,
this relatively cheaper price does not attract investors, does not trigger exports,
and maintains an unsatisfactory GDP growth and the public and private debts
with unsustainable levels.
The Portuguese
governments’ enthusiastic bet on tourism will tend to be a failure. Even if we do not consider a return to political stability in
North Africa that would attract again the middle / low echelons of European tourists,
mass tourism is not a generator of high income because it does not generate a
lot of skilled labor; it does not allow the use of technologies, because it requires
Interpersonal relations; is a sector widely used by mafia capitals and where tax
evasion is high; the tourist’s attraction networks are dominated by tourist emitting
countries, not by tourist receivers; investment in real estate, in seasonal tourism
zones, needs a long time to allow capital recovery; and, finally, in a country like
Portugal, the imported component is high, as it is high for the indigenous population.
And there are also aspects of the competition’s alternative
destinations which cannot be met by transforming Lisbon’s center into a veritable
manger, but with pretentious menus, accompanied by high decibel emitting “pimba”[2] festivals.
Finally, let
us do a convenient comparison being between Portugal and Spain, in the area of labor
costs in euros per hour. In 2000, the cost
of a Spanish worker was 29% higher than that of a Portuguese worker and this distance
clearly increases up to 2005 until it becomes quite stable from 2008, around 60%.
Ironically, it can be said that the austerity and monitoring
of the two economies by the Community institutions (and the IMF in the Portuguese
case) crystallized the relation between labor’s costs calculated for the two Peninsula
countries, consolidating a significantly larger difference than that registered
at the beginning of the century.
Primary Source: Eurostat
To be
continued
--------------
This and other
texts at:
[2] Pimba is a style of popular music,
repetitive, with common sexual references, a mix of rural and Brazilian influences
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